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The Changing Complexion of
Workplace Law: Labor and
Employment Decisions of the
Supreme Court's 1999-2000 Term
James J. Brudney*
I. Introduction and Overview
A British novelist famous in his time once observed that a lawyer
without history is a mere mechanic, but, with some knowledge of history, he may call himself an architect.' At the dawn of a new century
of Supreme Court workplace law, it seems especially appropriate to
offer some perspective on the recent and relatively recent past. Before
addressing the seven cases involving labor and employment issues decided by the Supreme Court in the Term just ended, I want briefly to
describe (in what I hope are not mechanical terms) how the Court's
interests in labor and employment law have evolved from the start of
the Burger Era in 1969 to the current, mature stage of the Rehnquist
Court.
Reviewing the Supreme Court's decisions over the past three decades, I identified nearly 600 opinions dealing directly with some aspect
of the relationship between employee and employer, union and employer, or union and employee. 2 Compilation of the database required
making occasional subjective judgments, but the vast majority of cases
were not borderline. Further, I benefited from the fine work of my predecessors in this position. By relying on the annual review of workplace

law decisions, published in THE

LABOR LAWYER

since the early 1980s,

I was able to cross-check as well as supplement my electronic search.
* James J. Brudney is a law professor at The Ohio State University College of Law.
Mr. Brudney thanks Victor Brudney, Doug Cole, Ruth Colker, Anne Doyle, and Deborah
Merritt for valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts; Lisa Knickerbocker, Brian
Ray, Stephanie Smith, and the College of Law Library Research Staff for splendid research
assistance; Jon and Elizabeth Pevehouse for their wonderful work on coding and quantitative analysis; Nancy Darling for her skillful preparation of power point slides and her
overall virtuosity; and Michele Newton for her excellent secretarial support.
1. WALTER Scorr, Guy MANNERING, 213 (PD. Garside ed., 1999).

2. The database includes 587 cases decided from the 1969 through 1999 terms.
For each term, I reviewed published opinions (signed and per curiam) through a series
of searches in the Westlaw FLB-SCT database keyed to numerous titles and sections of
the U.S. Code. The search yielded far more than 587 decisions; review of Westlaw summaries allowed me to eliminate cases citing the searched-for code sections that did not
directly involve the employment relationship.
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Figure 1
Labor and Employment Decisions as a Percentage
of Total Decisions: Three Year Trends
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Workplace law issues have been an important component of the
Court's docket throughout the Burger and Rehnquist eras. A look at
three year trends from the 1969 through 1999 Terms reveals two distinct storylines. First, there was a noticeable jump in the proportion of
workplace cases in the early Burger years. Labor and employment decisions comprised less than 10 percent of the Court's total decisions at
the start of the Burger Court; the percentage rose to 17 percent by the
mid-1970s.3 An increase from one-tenth to one-sixth of the Court's decision docket represents a substantial change.
The other noteworthy theme is that since the mid-1970s, the percentage of labor and employment cases has remained remarkably stable at around 16 percent.4 The Court's consistent level of interest in the
workplace law area over 25 years is impressive in light of changes that
have occurred in congressional and presidential agendas, major economic and social developments outside the workplace, and shifting
ideological priorities among the Justices. Further, the labor and employment law share of the Court's opinion docket has held constant
while the Supreme Court's overall number of decisions has plunged 40
percent since the early 1980s. This area of law evidently is regarded by

3. The precise percentages were 9.0% of 379 total opinions in 1969-1971; 11.4%
of 440 total opinions in 1972-1974; and 17.0% of 429 opinions in 1975-1977.
4. Following the rise to 17.0% in 1975-1977, the precise percentages were 15.4%
of 403 opinions in 1978-1980; 18.3% of 458 opinions in 1981-1983; 17.0% of 448 opinions
in 1984-1986; 16.6% of 415 opinions in 1987-1989; 13.7% of 335 opinions in 1990-1992;
15.7% of 248 opinions in 1993-1995; and 15.7% of 345 opinions in 1996-1999. Data for
the total number of decisions, including signed opinions and orally argued per curiams,
came from LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS &
DEVELOPMENTS 90-93 (2d ed. 1996). Epstein's data covers the 1969 through 1994 terms.
For the 1995-1999 terms, I relied on UNITED STATES LAW WEEK, which published a Table
of all argued cases decided by opinion at the conclusion of each term.
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Figure 2
Labor-Management Relations as a Percentage of L & E Decisions:
Burger Era, Three Year Trends
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the Court as essential rather than expendable; it has retained its onesixth share even as the Court has scaled back to a far leaner caseload.
When examining subject matter composition within workplace law,
one can see more dramatic shifts and upheavals over these three decades. During the first six terms of the Burger era (1969-1974), labormanagement relations cases comprised over one-half of the Court's
labor and employment opinions. 5 The proportion dropped to around 30
percent in the later Burger years, but much of this decline resulted
from a change in the "denominator." The actual number of labormanagement relations cases decreased modestly during the 17 year
period, while the total number of labor and employment decisions more
than doubled between the start and finish of the Burger Court. 6
For the nine terms from 1975-83, covering the middle and later
Burger Court era, controversies involving race or sex discrimination7
generated one-third of the Court's labor and employment opinions.
5. The labor-management relations category includes The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, the Railway Labor Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
the Federal Service Labor Management Relations Act of 1978, and a smattering of other
cases in which labor-management or union-employee conflicts arose. Labor-management
relations decisions comprised 76.5% of the 34 labor and employment decisions in 19691971 and 54% of the 50 labor and employment decisions in 1972-1974.
6. There were 26 labor-management relations decisions in the 1969-1971 terms
and 27 such decisions in the 1972-1974 terms. The Court decided 31 labor-management
relations cases in the 1981-1983 terms and 20 such cases in the 1984-1986 terms.
7. The race/sex discrimination category includes Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Civil War era statutes (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985) when
they implicate race or sex discrimination, and also race or sex discrimination cases invoking or relying on constitutional provisions (chiefly 14th Amendment and 5th Amendment). Race or sex discrimination decisions were 34.2% of the 73 labor and employment
opinions in 1975-1977, 35.5% of the 62 labor and employment opinions in 1978-1980,
and 32.1% of the 84 labor and employment opinions in 1981-1983.
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(Figure 3) This proportion remained at one-third during the peak period
of overall labor and employment law decisionmaking by the Court. The
priority given to these two areas-labor-management relations and race
or sex discrimination-is not surprising when one considers the prominent status of unions in the private sector through the 1970s, as well as
the commanding role played by civil rights matters in the political and
constitutional arenas during the late 1970s and early 1980s.
In the Rehnquist era, both labor-management relations and race or
sex discrimination have come to occupy a distinctly less prominent place
in the Court's decision docket. The decline has been especially steep from
the Burger years with respect to labor-management relations. (Figure 4)

Figure 3
Race/Sex Discrimination as a Percentage of L & E Decisions:
Burger Era, Three Year Trends
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Figure 4
Labor-Management Relations as a Percentage
of L & E Decisions: Three Year Trends
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The Changing Complexion of Workplace Law
In addition to the proportion having fallen by more than half during the
Burger period itself (from 75 percent to about 30 percent), the labormanagement relations percentage has been halved again over the course
of the Rehnquist years (from 30 percent to 13 percent).8 The latter decrease is more palpable, as it has occurred during a sizeable falloff in
the number of total labor and employment law cases heard by the Court.
Thus, the early Rehnquist Court decided 21 labor-management relations
cases in the 1987-1989 Terms but has decided only seven such cases in
its last four Terms.
The waning of Supreme Court attentions is noticeable for issues of
race and sex discrimination as well. Notwithstanding a recent modest
upturn, the share of labor and employment decisions addressing race
or sex discrimination has receded from 30 percent to less than 15 percent since the early 1980s. 9 Once again, the decline is more dramatic
in absolute terms given the Court's diminished workload; from 27 race
or sex discrimination decisions in 1981-83 to 18 such decisions in
1987-89, to eight race or sex discrimination decisions in the past four
Terms (1996-1999). The current Term serves as an exclamation point
with regard to each of these trends. For the second time since 1994,
Figure 5
Race/Sex Discrimination as a Percentage
of L & E Decisions: Three Year Trends
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8. Labor-management relations cases fell from 76.5% of 34 labor and employment
decisions (1969-1971) to 30.4% of 69 decisions (1987-1989) and then declined again to
13.0% of 54 decisions (1996-1999).
9. Race and sex discrimination cases comprised 32.1% of 84 labor and employment
decisions in 1981-1983; they were 14.8% of 54 decisions in 1996-1999. It is important
not to overstate the decline in Supreme Court attention to the race and sex discrimination
area. Interpretive issues that arise in Court decisions construing the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act may be applicable under Title
VII as well. See, e.g., infra Part IV (discussing burdens of proof in employment discrimination actions).
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Figure 6
Other Discrimination as a Percentage of L & E Decisions: Three Year Trends
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the Court's labor and employment law decisions do not include a single
labor relations or race/sex discrimination case.
What has replaced these stalwarts in the Court's favor? The answer is statutory suitors from a variety of subject matter realms. The
Rehnquist Court has paid more attention to laws addressing other
forms of discrimination, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).' ° (Figure
6) There has been some increase in focus on statutes addressing the
right to minimum levels of compensation, benefits, or safety and health
protection. (Figure 7) This minimum standards category includes the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Mine
Safety and Health Act, and other laws that set floors with respect to
terms and conditions of employment." Cases under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) or other retirement-oriented
statutes also have occupied more of the Court's attention since the mid1980s. 12 (Figure 8)

10. In addition to cases arising under the ADEA or ADA, the other-discrimination
category includes § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Civil War era statutes when parties
invoke them to allege discrimination based on factors other than race or sex, and also
statutes addressing discrimination against veterans. Percentages went from 7.2% of 69
labor and employment decisions in 1987-1989 to 20.4% of 54 decisions in 1996-1999.
11. There are a myriad of statutes in this category that arose only once or twice as
the focus of Court decisions. Examples include the Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act (WARN), Agricultural Workers Protection Act, Seaman's Wage Act,
Hours of Service Act, and Surface Transportation Act. Percentages for this full category
of minimum protection statutes increased from 10.1% of 69 labor and employment decisions in 1987-1989 to 23.1% of 39 decisions in 1993-1995 before dropping back to 14.8%
of 54 decisions in 1996-1999.
12. Besides ERISA, the Court has construed specialized federal retirement statutes
affecting civil service employees, railroad employees, coal industry employees, and mili-
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Figure 7
Minimum Standards as a Percentage of L & E Decisions: Three Year Trends

% Minimum
Standards

Cases

'69'71

'72'74

'75'77

'78'80

'81'83

'84'86

'87'89

'90'92

'93'95

'96'99

[ or erm

Figure 8
Retirement/ERISA as a Percentage of L & E Decisions: Three Year Trends
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The current Term amply illustrates this changing complexion in
workplace law. The Court's seven labor and employment law decisions
include two cases addressing the ADEA,13 two reviewing statutes that
regulate minimum standards for employees, 4 and two involving the
meaning of ERISA. 15
tary employees. Percentages increased from 11.6% of 69 labor and employment decisions
in 1987-1989 to 20.4% of 54 decisions in 1996-1999.
13. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000); Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).
14. See Christensen v. Harris County, 120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000) (addressing claims for
compensatory time under FLSA); United States v. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000) (addressing claims based on state laws that impose minimum training requirements).
15. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000); Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v.
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2180 (2000).
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The Court's more diverse diet of workplace law cases probably reflects the influence of numerous legal and policy changes. A sharp decline in union density has diminished the level of labor-management
controversy competing for the Court's attention. The resolution of many
major interpretive battles under the now middle-aged Title VII has
similarly diminished the urgency of Supreme Court litigation in that
area. Perhaps more important than these first two factors, there has
been a proliferation of federal workplace enactments since the early
1970s, mostly in the areas of minimum standards, retirement, and disability discrimination. Congress's greater reliance on government regulation as a means of ordering employment relations has presented the
Court with a range of new interpretive issues. Finally, there have been
major changes in the demographics and structure of the labor market.
An increasingly older workforce has given rise to pervasive concerns
with respect to matters of retirement eligibility and benefits as well as
age discrimination by employers. Corporate downsizing, the rise of the
contingent workforce, and the related fragmentation in job markets
means that millions of employees change careers more frequently than
in the past, 16 a change often accompanied by real or perceived mistreatment in diverse occupational and jurisdictional settings. Whatever
weight one assigns to these different explanations, the result is that

Figure 9
Decisions Other Than Labor-Management Relations and Race/Sex
Discrimination as a Percentage of L & E Decisions: Three Year Trends
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16. See, e.g., RICHARD S. BELOUS, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF
THE TEMPORARY, PART-TIME AND SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE (1989); BENNETT HARRISON & BARRY BLUESTONE, THE GREAT U-TURN: CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND THE
POLARIZING OF AMERICA (1988). The Future of Work: CareerEvolution, THE ECONOMIST,

Jan. 29, 2000, at 89-92; Ronald Henkoff, So, You Want to Change Your Job, FORTUNE,
Jan. 15, 1996, at 52.
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issues other than labor-management relations and race or sex discrimination now occupy the bulk of the Court's attention when it comes to
workplace law.' 7 Since the early 1990s, these non-labor-management
relations, non-race/sex cases have comprised over 70 percent of the
Court's workplace law decisions. (Figure 9)
Amidst the ebb and flow of different subject matter areas, one
might wonder how employees and unions are faring against employers.
The short answer is, employees' and unions' won-loss record against
employers is pretty consistent over time. There is no substantial difference between the Burger and Rehnquist eras; employees and unions
won slightly over 50 percent of the time before the Burger Court (53.2
percent) and they have won just under 50 percent of their cases in the
Rehnquist Court (47.5 percent).1 8
Figure 10
Employees Versus Employers as Prevailing Parties
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17. Apart from the statutes mentioned at notes 10-12 supra and accompanying
text, this category also includes a series of cases arising under negligence-based federal
statutes that apply mostly to workers in the railroad or maritime industries (e.g., Jones
Act and Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)) as well as miscellaneous statutes (e.g.,
immigration, antitrust, civil service, social security) in which employee interests or concerns were presented. The seventh case from the just-ended term falls in this miscellaneous category. See Beck v. Prupis, 120 S. Ct. 1608 (2000) (raising claims under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)). Percentages for all cases
other than labor relations and race/sex discrimination went from 14.7% of 34 labor and
employment cases decided in 1969-1971 and 26% of 50 cases decided in 1972-1974 to
43.5% of 69 cases decided in 1987-1989, 71.8% of 39 cases decided in 1993-1995, and
72.2% of 54 cases decided in 1996-1999.
18. There is also a smaller group of decisions, less than 60 altogether, pitting employees against unions. These cases involve duty of fair representation or union security
claims, Landrum Griffin Act claims, and also claims of race or sex discrimination by
employees against their union. Here employees have done slightly better in the Rehnquist
era (45% wins in Burger years v. 52.9% wins in Rehnquist years). The number of decisions
is quite small, however, averaging about two per term. The difference in win rates be-
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These results may strike some as counterintuitive. The Burger
Court, while more conservative than the Warren Court on employee
rights issues, is viewed as distinctly less conservative than the Rehnquist Court in the workplace law area. I am at an early stage in my
analysis of the database, but a more realistic view of these results is
that they are incomplete rather than counterintuitive. As a general proposition, disputes are more likely to be litigated (rather than settled) in
20
close cases19 ; this is true at the appellate as well as trial court levels.
When both parties can invest substantial resources and present reasonable legal arguments to a Court that has purely discretionary jurisdic21
tion, the parties' win rates may tend to be comparable over time.
Further, a simple win-loss evaluation does not account for the magnitude or impact of a decision. For example, a union loss in a major
case like Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB 22 and a union win in a minor case like
Auciello Iron Works, Inc. v. NLRB 23 count the same. 24 Finally, and perhaps most important, using individual case outcomes to measure
changes in Supreme Court ideology or policy fails to take account of
changes in the content and difficulty of cases brought before the Court.
Conservative Justices can appear more liberal if they accept and then
tween employees and unions is not statistically significant, and one should be cautious
about attributing any practical importance to outcome differences in light of the small
volume.
19. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13-17 (1984); George L. Priest, Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman's Mistakes, 14 J. LEGAL STuD. 215, 216-21 (1985).
20. See Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections
on CurrentPracticein FederalAppellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385,390-91
(1983); Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretationof
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 190-91 (1987).
21. As a rough comparison, the Harvard Law Review in its annual Supreme Court
review issue reported that for the 1990 through 1998 terms, the Court decided a total of
27 federal taxation cases, 15 won by the government and 12 by the taxpayer. These results
are presented in Table III (Subject Matter of Dispositions With Full Opinions) contained
in the initial issue of volumes 105 through 113.
22. 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (restricting nonemployees' access to employer premises
during organizing drive).
23. 517 U.S. 781 (1996) (reaffirming settled law regarding proper time in a contract
negotiation for employer to express good faith doubt as to union's continued majority
status).
24. Similarly, win/loss totals do not reflect the procedural setting of the case. It is
possible, for instance, that employee victories in the Supreme Court more often involve
reversals of pro-employer decisions that awarded judgment as a matter of law, whereas
employer triumphs more often involve affirmances of such pro-employer lower court judgments. Compare Ruth Colker, The Americans With DisabilitiesAct: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999) (finding that employers prevail at an extremely high rate in ADA cases, in district court and circuit courts, and arguing that
overuse of summary judgment is major reason for this trend). If further exploration of
the database reflects the presence of such a pattern, it would mean employee wins in the
Supreme Court are more likely to be partial victories requiring additional litigation,
whereas employer triumphs at the High Court level are more likely to provide full and
final vindication.
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Figure 11
Public and Private Employees as Prevailing Party
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decide cases in which pro-civil rights votes were relatively easy to
cast.2 5 In the labor relations and civil rights areas, the employer community may well play a much larger role in presenting "hard cases"
than it did 20 years ago. Employers may push the envelope of what
they view as a sympathetic Court; their win-loss rate would perhaps
be higher if they had sought less ambitious results.
Looking at outcomes from some different vantage points, it is noteworthy that public employees fare significantly worse against employers
than their private counterparts; this applies for both the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts (Burger 44.0 percent v. 56.7 percent; Rehnquist 36.1
percent v. 51.9 percent).26 Preliminary analyses indicate the difference
does not seem to be attributable to the constitutional nature of public
employees' claims; it may instead reflect the Court's deferential view
toward state and local governments though more study is needed here.
Another interesting feature involves the role played by Supreme
Court deference to administrative agencies. Agency deference is an im25. See Lawrence Baum, MeasuringPolicy Change in the Rehnquist Court, 23 AM.
POL. Q. 373 (1995) (concluding that early Rehnquist Court's record of outcomes in civil
liberties cases overstated support for civil liberties because Court increasingly accepted
cases in which pro-civil liberties votes were relatively easy to cast). See generally,Gregory
A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S.
Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1109 (1988) (finding that Justices are significantly
more likely to grant review when interest groups file amicus curiae briefs in support of
a certiorari petition).
26. The use of significant refers to results that are statistically significant using
the chi-square statistic (Pearson's coefficient). The difference between public employee
and private employee win rates was significant (p = .049) for the 301 Burger Court cases
pitting employees or unions against employers (217 private, 84 public). The difference
also was significant (p = .035) for the 217 Rehnquist Court cases (156 private; 61 public)
involving employees or unions against employers. Finally, the difference was significant
(p = .004) for the 518 total cases.
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Figure 12
Agency's Position as Prevailing Before the Court
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portant element of statutory construction, one that in theory should
have become more prominent since the Court's decision in Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 27 Many workplace law statutes, as well as applicable provisions of the Constitution,
are enforceable through private rights of action and involve little or no
agency presence. Agencies therefore have not been players in most of
the Court's labor and employment cases. Of the approximately 175 cases
in which an agency rule, adjudication, or guidance was at issue, there is
no significant difference between the success of agency positions before
and after Chevron (68.5 percent v. 62.1 percent). The majority of cases
in which the Court addressed an agency's legal position involved either
the National Labor Relations Board or the Department of Labor. Agency
win rates were virtually identical for these two repeat players: 67 percent
for the Labor Board and 63 percent for the Labor Department.
A final component of this brief overview involves the Court's attention to workplace law cases that present constitutional issues. The constitutional share of the Court's labor and employment decisions has
ranged from 15 percent to 25 percent for most of our 30 year period; it
was highest between 1975 and 1986, and it has been relatively consistent since the Rehnquist era began. 21 (Figure 13)
Once again, however, the substantive details of the Court's constitutional workplace law decisions reveal patterns not apparent from the
broad picture. During the second half of our three decade period, the
27. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
28. Percentages were 22% of 50 labor and employment decisions from 1972-1974;
32.9% of 73 decisions in 1975-1977; 14.5% of 62 decisions in 1978-1980; 25% of 84 decisions in 1981-1983; 26.3% of 76 decisions in 1984-1986; 17.4% of 69 decisions in 19871989; 15.2% of 46 decisions in 1990-1992; 17.9% of 39 decisions in 1993-1995, and 22.2%
of 54 decisions in 1996-1999.
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Figure 13
Constitutional Cases as a Percentage of L & E Decisions: Three Year Trends
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Employee Rights and State Sovereignty in Constitutional L & E Decisions
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Court has shifted its relative focus of attention from cases in which
individual employees contest governmental action under the First,
Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendments to cases in which state governments
challenge federal regulation of the public employment relationship under the Tenth or Eleventh Amendments. (Figure 14)
Three-fifths of the cases in which employees claimed that a federal
or state employer or a union denied their rights to freedom of speech
or association, due process, or equal protection were decided between
1969 and 1983; only two-fifths have been decided since 1984. But when
examining workplace law cases that implicate federalism and matters
of dual sovereignty, the emphasis is quite the opposite. The Court decided just over 30 percent of these cases between 1969 and 1983 and
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has decided nearly 70 percent since 1984. While the overall number of
employee rights constitutional cases greatly exceeds the number of
states' rights decisions (91 to 13), the two categories have grown closer
in recent years even in terms of absolute numbers. Over the past six
Terms, including the one just completed, the Court has decided nine
employment law cases involving the free speech, equal protection, or
due process claims of employees under the Constitution and four workplace law cases involving Tenth or Eleventh Amendment claims by
States. In this respect among others, we have surely come a long way
from the early Burger era.
II. Sovereign Immunity and Age Discrimination
In the highest profile labor and employment case of this Term, Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents,29 the Court extended its recently developed Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence into the heart of Congress's civil rights agenda. ° The Court in Kimel held that Congress
had exceeded its authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment when it subjected States to monetary damages suits by their employees as part of the 1974 amendments to the ADEA. 31
A. Background to the Kimel Decision
1. The Court's Recent Eleventh Amendment Appetite
Since the mid-1990s, the Court has displayed a keen interest in
vindicating Eleventh Amendment challenges to federal statutory authority. On five separate occasions between 1996 and 1999, Court decisions have limited congressional power to authorize private rights of
action against the States. A brief review of two of those decisions provides necessary context for Kimel.
The lead case, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,32 held that
Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause of Article I to
abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. In
overruling its own 1989 decision to the contrary, the Court concluded
that nothing in Article I can be used to escape the limitation on Article
29. 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
30. The Eleventh Amendment states, "[tihe Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. Historically, the Court has interpreted the
11th Amendment to bar private suits for monetary relief against a State unless either
(a) the State itself has consented to be so sued or (b) Congress has subjected the States
to such private actions through a legitimate exercise of its supervening federal authority.
See Pa. v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruledon othergrounds by Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
31. 120 S. Ct. at 650. Section five states, "[t]he Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend.

XlV, § 5.
32. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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III jurisdiction that was embodied in the Eleventh Amendment.3 3 After
Seminole Tribe, the Court's decisions left open section five of the Fourteenth Amendment as a permissible means for Congress to abrogate
the sovereign immunity of the States.
The following Term, in City of Boerne v. Flores,34 the Court held
that Congress had exceeded its powers under section five when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).35 In
RFRA, Congress had responded to a 1990 Supreme Court ruling that
under the Fourteenth Amendment a State need not demonstrate a compelling interest in order to justify laws of general applicability that
incidentally burden the free exercise of religion.36 The 1993 Act required use of a strict scrutiny test in such circumstances,3 v and the
Boerne Court-reaffirming the remedial nature of Congress's power
under section five-concluded that Congress had engaged in substantive rather than enforcement legislation. 3' The Court readily acknowledged that Congress has the authority under section five to enact laws
enforcing the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.3 9 But in
creating a strict scrutiny standard for state legislation where the Court
had previously applied a deferential standard of review, Congress had
gone too far, in essence "determin[ing for itself the nature of] what
constitutes a constitutional violation."4 °
Notwithstanding its emphatic distinction between permissibly remedial and impermissibly substantive legislation, the Boerne Court
recognized that the line between the two is not easy to draw.4 1 Seeking
to provide guidance as to when preventive federal legislation may qualify as an appropriate section five remedial measure, the Court set forth
a somewhat elusive "congruence and proportionality" test.42 With respect to "congruence between the means used and the ends to be
achieved," the Court noted the importance of examining the legislative
record.4 3 The mischief addressed by Congress must itself be constitu33. Id. at 72-73, overruling Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1. The Union Gas decision dealt
with the Commerce Clause, whereas Seminole Tribe involved the parallel provisions of
the Indian Commerce Clause. The Court in Seminole Tribe found the two clauses were
indistinguishable for Eleventh Amendment purposes, and overruled Union Gas. See 517
U.S. at 62-63, 66.

34. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (1994).
36. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
38. See 521 U.S. at 532, 534. For succinct and thoughtful treatment of the Boerne
decision, see Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REv. 653, 667-72
(2000); Brian Ray, Note, "Out the Window?": Prospectsfor the EPA andFMLA After Kimel
v. Florida Board of Regents, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2001).
39. 521 U.S. at 519.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 520.
43. Id. at 530.
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tionally cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Court's
view, a section five initiative can be justified only if Congress has identified or pointed to unconstitutional behavior engaged in by the States.
The RFRA fell short on this score, in marked contrast to the Voting
Rights Act of the 1960s which responded to intentional discrimination
by Southern States.4 4 The legislative history for RFRA simply lacked
evidence that States were passing laws of general application moti65
vated by religious bigotry that would justify strict scrutiny review.
The Boerne Court's analysis also pointedly suggested that without
congruence there could be no proportionality. The Court assessed
RFRA's broad reach and scope, and concluded that the Act imposed
46
heavy burdens on the States' traditional general regulatory powers.
In reasoning that these burdens "far exceed any pattern or practice of
unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause," the Court
again relied on the importance of Congress's failure to identify constitutionally cognizable misconduct by the States.4 v
2. Facts and Lower Court Rulings
Perhaps not surprisingly, many States viewed the Court's invalidation of RFRA as inviting similar challenges to federal civil rights
legislation that exposed them to monetary liability. A prime target immediately became the 1974 amendments to the ADEA, extending the
scope of that landmark employment discrimination statute to include
state and local governments.4" Between April and December of 1998,
within 18 months of the City of Boerne decision, eight circuits decided
cases in which a state employer challenged older employees' right to
44. Id. at 530 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)).
45. 521 U.S. at 530.
46. Id. at 534-35.
47. Id. at 534. The unconstitutional conduct at issue in this portion of the Court's
opinion was the possible action by states that would have been at odds with the RFRA,
i.e., laws motivated by religious bigotry. Thus, the Court's proportionality discussion is
not entirely independent in analytical terms: it also relies in part on the Court's earlier
conclusion that RFRA is per se a change in the substantive constitutional standard that
only the Court can prescribe.
In the 1998 term, the Court applied its City of Boerne approach to invalidate two
federal laws outside the civil rights arena. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) [Florida Prepaid] (holding Congress lacks
power to abrogate States' immunity from patent infringement claims under section five);
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999)
(holding Congress did not validly abrogate States' immunity from trademark misrepresentation claims under section five). The Court's analysis reaffirmed the important role
it has assigned to legislative history. The inadequate record Congress had made regarding
constitutionally cognizable State misconduct figured prominently in the Court's determination that a patent infringement statute lacked proportionality as applied to the
States. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640-47. A third Eleventh Amendment defeat for
Congress in the 1998 term was Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress lacks power under Article I to abrogate States' sovereign immunity in state court
as well as federal court).
48. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2), (3), (4), 88 Stat. 74 (1974).
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sue for damages under the ADEA.49 Two aspects of these cases caught
my attention. First, plaintiffs in all eight circuits were university employees. Most of them were professors, and some were even employees
of a state law school. It is rare that a middle-aged legal academic at a
state university gets to combine theory and practice in such a directly
personal setting.
The second noteworthy aspect of these eight decisions is that most
were not prepared to limit Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers
with respect to the ADEA. Six of the eight appellate courts concluded
that Congress had acted in congruent and proportional fashion when
extending ADEA protections to state employees.5" Indeed, the long and
thoughtful lead decision from the Seventh Circuit was authored by a
Reagan appointee."1 The lower courts were applying the Boerne test,
but they did not view Boerne's holding as determinative on this issue.
The Kimel case, one of the two appellate court decisions to come
down against Congress during this period, stems from three separate
actions brought within the Eleventh Circuit. Senior university faculty
members in Alabama and Florida alleged they were victims of a range
of discriminatory practices, including an age-based evaluation system
and a refusal to pay certain previously agreed upon salary adjustments.5 2 Plaintiffs in each case sought back pay and liquidated or punitive damages. 53 Both the university in Alabama and the Board of
Regents in Florida moved to dismiss, contending the suits were barred
by the Eleventh Amendment.5 4 The district courts split on the Eleventh
Amendment issue and the court of appeals consolidated the cases for
55
review.
By a 2-to-1 majority, the Eleventh Circuit held, on a divided rationale, that the ADEA did not abrogate the states' sovereign immunity.
Judge Edmondson took the position that Congress in the text of the
49. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (1lth Cir. 1998); Goshtasby v.
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1998); Scott v. Univ. of Miss., 148 F.3d
493 (5th Cir. 1998); Keeton v. Univ. of Nev. Sys., 150 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 1998); Humenansky v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998); Coger v. Bd. of Regents
of the State of Tenn., 154 F.3d 296 (6th Cir. 1998); Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th
Cir. 1998); Cooper v. N.Y State Office of Mental Health, 162 F.3d 770 (2d Cir. 1998).
50. See Goshtasby,141 F.3d at 769-72 (7th Cir.), Scott, 148 F.3d at 501-03 (5th
Cir.), Keeton, 150 F.3d at 1057-58 (9th Cir.), Coger, 154 F.3d at 305-07 (6th Cir.), Migneault, 158 F.3d at 1136-39 (10th Cir.), Cooper, 162 F.3d at 777-78 (2d Cir.).
51. See Goshtasby, 141 F.3d at 764-72. Judge Kanne, the author of the Goshtasby
decision, was appointed by President Reagan in 1987. His fellow panel members were
Judge Rovner (a Reagan district judge appointee elevated by President Bush) and Judge
Evans (a Carter district judge appointee elevated by President Clinton).
52. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 638. The third district court case involved a Florida
Corrections Department employee who alleged he was not promoted due to his age. Id.
at 639.
53. Id. at 638-39.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 639.
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ADEA had not expressed an unmistakably clear legislative intent to
abrogate, an intent that was required under the Supreme Court's earlier precedents. 5' He therefore did not reach the question of whether
the ADEA could have been properly enacted under section five, although he expressed doubt on that score as well." Judge Cox declined
to rely on Judge Edmondson's "no clear intent to abrogate" analysis.
He concluded that "[w]hether or not Congress clearly expressed its intent, it lacks the power to abrogate the states' immunity.., under the
ADEA."58 Applying the City of Boerne standard, Judge Cox expressed
the view that the ADEA came up short, both because Congress conferred rights "far more extensive than those the Fourteenth Amendment provides" and because the statute was not "a proportional response to any widespread violation of the elderly's constitutional
59
rights.,,
B. The Supreme Court's Reasoning in Kimel
The Supreme Court in Kimel considered both the Edmondson and
Cox justifications. Writing for seven members of the Court (all except
Justices Thomas and Kennedy), Justice O'Connor concluded that the
language of the ADEA does make Congress's intention to abrogate
the States' immunity unmistakably clear.6 ° The Court focused on the
ADEA's statement in section 626(c) that its provisions "shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in" certain specified sections of the FLSA.6 ' These incorporated
provisions included section 216(b) authorizing employees to bring actions for back pay "against any employer (including a public agency)
in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction."6 2 The Court
in several prior cases had construed the language of these two provisions-sections 626(c) and 216(b)-to mean that the ADEA plainly
incorporated FLSA remedies. 3 Respondents and Justices Thomas
and Kennedy maintained that specific language in the two provisions

56. 139 F.3d at 1430-33 (citing and relying on Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223
(1989)).
57. Id. at 1430 & n.8.
58. Id. at 1445.
59. Id. at 1446-47. Judge Hackett, the third member of the panel, dissented from
the panel's holding. He concluded that Congress's intent to abrogate the States' immunity
from ADEA claims was stated with unmistakable clarity in the statute and that the
ADEA is a valid exercise of Congress's section five powers. Id. at 1434-40.
60. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 640-42.
61. Id. at 640 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)).
62. Id. at 640 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). The term public agency is defined to
include "the government of a State" and "any agency of... a state." Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(x)).
63. See id. at 641(citing McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352,
357 (1995); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 167 (1989); Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 582 (1978)).
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was not clear enough to pass muster under the Court's stringent test,64
but the majority indicated its unwillingness to find ambiguity where
none had previously existed.65 The Court also was influenced by the
fact that Congress in 1974 had added the specific references to "public
agencies" and "Federal or State" courts in direct response to a 1973
Supreme Court holding that the original language
of section 216(b) was
66
not clear enough to abrogate States' immunity.
Having determined that the ADEA manifested Congress's intent
to abrogate, the Court went on to hold that Congress lacked the constitutional power to effectuate this plain intent. Writing for the same
67
slender five-person majority that had formed in Seminole Tibe,
Justice O'Connor offered a two-pronged analysis in concluding that the
ADEA is not "appropriate legislation" under section five.
First, the majority focused on the nature of unconstitutional conduct that could be addressed by Congress. The Court insisted that the
substantive requirements not to discriminate that are imposed by the
ADEA on State governments are "disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the Act."68 Here,
the Court relied on its trilogy of earlier decisions applying the deferential rational basis standard to uphold mandatory retirement of public
employees under several statutes. 69 The Court in Murgia,Bradley, and
Gregory had determined that reliance by legislatures on broad and imperfect generalizations with respect to age did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. In the Kimel Court's view, the mandatory retirement
trilogy made clear that from a constitutional standpoint, a State may
invoke old age as a proxy for physical or mental deterioration, or for
any other quality related to the State's legitimate interests as an em-

64. Id. at 640-41 (addressing argument that the remedies accorded under
§ 626(c)(1) render incorporation of § 216(b) ambiguous); id. at 641-42 (addressing argument that phrase "court of competent jurisdiction" in § 216(b) makes Congress's intent
to abrogate less than clear).
65. Id. at 641.
66. 120 S. Ct. at 642 (discussing Congress's language additions to overcome the
Court's concerns expressed in Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Dep't of
Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 283 (1973)).
67. The five members of the Kimel majority, Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, voted together in Seminole Tribe, Florida Prepaid,College
Savings Bank, and Alden. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented in
each case, often in heated terms. The alignment in Boerne was somewhat different; there,
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg joined the majority while Justice O'Connor joined the
dissenters.
68. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 645 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 645-46 (discussing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470-73 (1991))
(holding that mandatory retirement of state judges is not violative of Equal Protection
Clause); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 98-112 (1979) (holding that mandatory retirement
of foreign service employees does not violate equal protection component of Fifth Amendment); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,314-17 (1976) (holding that mandatory
retirement of state police does not violate Equal Protection Clause).
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ployer, even if the proxy is starkly inaccurate.7" It followed, said the
majority, that the ADEA, which limits or conditions the use of age as a
proxy in a wide range of employment settings, necessarily prohibits
substantially more state employer conduct than would be held unconstitutional under the rational basis standard.7 1 Thus, the ADEA as a
conceptual matter "cannot be understood
as responsive to, or designed
72
to prevent, unconstitutional behavior."
The second prong of the Court's reasoning addressed the particulars of States' actual misconduct as employers in the age discrimination
area. Having virtually closed the door in principle on Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers to address age discrimination by the States,
the Court hesitated before shutting that door in practice. Even if the
ADEA does prohibit little conduct that a court would hold unconstitutional, the majority recognized there is more to the section five inquiry.
Congress possesses authority to enact "reasonably prophylactic legislation" under the Fourteenth Amendment in response to "[d]ifficult and
intractable problems" that Congress itself has identified.78 The Court
therefore examined the legislative record of the ADEA to determine
whether Congress had identified patterns or practices of age discrimination by state employers. The Court's review led it to find no such
evidence had been presented in congressional hearings or elsewhere in
the legislative history.74 Given that Congress lacked a reasonable basis
for believing prophylactic legislation was needed to address States' misconduct, the ADEA was not, as a practical and evidentiary matter, a
valid exercise of Congress's section five powers.
The Court closed by observing that its decision was not "the end of
75
the line" for state employees who are victims of age discrimination.
All 50 states have passed age discrimination laws, and avenues of recovery from state employers remain available under these statutes.
C. DisrespectingCongress
1. Section Five and Rational Basis
Unlike City of Boerne, where Congress in the RFRA had legislated
strict scrutiny to override the Court's rational basis test, the two
branches agree that age-based classifications warrant rational basis
review under the Equal Protection Clause. 76 One possible implication
70. See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 645-47.
71. See id. at 647-48.
72. Id. at 647 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).
73. Id. at 648.
74. Id. at 648-50.
75. Id. at 650.
76. Section two of the ADEA, setting forth congressional findings and purpose,
finds as a widespread national practice that employers are "setting ...arbitrary age
limits regardless of potential for job performance," and declares as a principal purpose
of the Act "to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment." 29 U.S.C. 621(a)(2),
621(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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of the Court's opinion is that Congress's powers under section five
should not-perhaps even can not-abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity when states' legislative or administrative judgments are subject only to minimal scrutiny. That implication, however, is at odds with
relatively recent Court decisions upholding exercises of the section five
power when the classifications Congress prohibited were reviewable
under a rational basis standard. In 1980, the Court in Maher v. Gagne
sustained Congress's abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity for
attorneys' fees claims stemming from unlawful denials of welfare benefits, denials subject only to rational basis scrutiny.7 Four years earlier,
the Court in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer upheld the Eleventh Amendment
abrogation contained in the 1972 legislation extending Title VII's ban
on gender discrimination to the states. 78 The Court in Fitzpatrick
acted at a time when9 rational basis review was still applicable to gen7
der classifications.
Governmental distinctions subject to rational basis review are not,
of course, immune from invalidation. The Court has a respected and
still vibrant tradition of holding States in violation of the Equal Protection clause if the challenged classification's relationship to State objectives "is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitraryor ir80
rational."
The Court chose to ignore that line of cases, presumably
because of its belief that most if not all arbitrary age discrimination is
not unconstitutionally arbitrary.8 ' By doing so, the Court made it
77. 448 U.S. 122, 124-25 & n.5, 132 (1980) (reciting non-suspect class nature of
equal protection claim and stating that Congress acts within section five authority in
allowing fee awards where "plaintiffprevails on a wholly statutory,non-civil-rights claim"
that is pendent to the aforementioned constitutional claim).
78. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
79. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971). It was not until the Term following
Fitzpatrickthat a majority of the Court held gender classifications were subject to heightened scrutiny. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976). A plurality of the Court had
so held in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-91 (1973) (Opinion of Brennan, J,
joined by Douglas, White and Marshall, JJ). But see id. at 691 (Stewart J., concurring in
judgment, based on Reed); id. at 691 (Powell, Burger and Blackmun JJ, concurring in
judgment but refusing to hold that classifications based on sex must be subject to heightened scrutiny). Justice Rehnquist, the lone dissenter in Frontiero, was the author of
Fitzpatrick;that opinion does not cite Frontiero,and indeed does not discuss which equal
protection standard should apply.
80. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (emphasis added) (invalidating application of local zoning ordinance to group home for mentally retarded). See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating state constitutional amendment that denies homosexuals and lesbians the right to obtain specific
statutory protections); Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14, 22 (1985) (invalidating provision
of tax credit only to residents); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74-79 (1972) (invalidating
double-bond prerequisite for appealing an adverse decision in wrongful eviction actions).
81. Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 647 (reaffirming Gregory'sconclusion that even if no judges
suffered significant deterioration in performance at age 70, a law mandating their retirement would not be unconstitutionally arbitrary or irrational). See also Kimel, 139
F.3d at 1447 (Cox, J. concurring) (noting that "ADEA was enacted to combat all arbitrariness, unconstitutional or not").
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much harder for Congress to regulate State employers with respect to
classifications not subject to heightened scrutiny.
2. Section Five and Section One
An even more troubling implication of the Kimel reasoning is that
Congress's powers under section five are in effect limited to conduct
that the Court has already declared unconstitutional-or would very
likely invalidate-under section one. Although the Court's opinion recites the traditional bromides about Congress being entitled to special
respect in this area,8 2 the majority's heavy reliance on the mandatory
retirement trilogy strongly suggests that a State's use of broad and
unsubstantiated generalizations when classifying or evaluating employees is as protected from section five congressional regulation as it
is from section one judicial invalidation.
There are historical and conceptual reasons to question this line of
analysis. As the Court itself has long recognized, the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment were principally concerned to
broaden the power of Congress, not the judiciary.8 3 In the wake of the
Court's failure to protect the rights of fugitive slaves or freed former
slaves before the Civil War,8 4 the amendment's sponsors and supporters
would not have tethered congressional enforcement authority under
section five to a possibly reluctant judiciary's enforcement approach. 5
The modern Court has repeatedly acknowledged Congress's central role
in enforcing the amendment's guarantees and has often equated the
scope of section five authority with the broad powers set forth in the
Necessary and Proper Clause of Article .86 In short, Congress's powers
would seem to go well beyond the invalidation or prohibition of conduct
already labeled unconstitutional, to encompass prevention and deterrence of conduct that Congress could rationally have determined would
threaten the right to equal protection.
Congress has two distinctive institutional virtues that buttress its
broad section five role. First, congressional enforcement is democratic,
whereas judicial review-especially strict scrutiny review of statutesis the opposite.8 1 When the Court eschews heightened scrutiny and
upholds statutes that mandatorily retire police officers, judges, and for82. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 644.
83. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 & n.7 (1966) (citing to historical
evidence); Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879).
84. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
393 (1856).
85. See Colker, supra note 38 at 663-64.
86. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176-77 (1980); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 326-27 (1966). Accord Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476 (1980) (opinion of
Burger, C.J.).
87. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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eign service employees, it is in essence deferring to legislative limits
placed on groups with adequate access to the political process. Even
here, the deference accorded in the trilogy was not the virtual invitation
to arbitrary treatment that is described in Kimel. 5 Still, this deference
does reflect the Court's understanding that its section one role is fundamentally antidemocratic and should be invoked with caution. It is
quite another matter, however, for the Court to apply such reservations
to Congress's politically accountable role under section five. Yet, that is
what the Kimel Court in essence has done by reasoning that Congress
should be constitutionally unable to prevent or deter arbitrary state
action against older persons who are not sufficiently "discrete and insular" to warrant strict scrutiny protection from the judiciary.
Congress's second institutional virtue, the capacity to gather and
evaluate information in both structured and informal settings, also contributes to a distinctive section five role. When it enacted the ADEA,
Congress amassed a powerful record illustrating the pervasive nature
of age-based stereotypes and discriminatory generalizations in the
American workplace.8 9 Its statutory response, which seeks to prohibit,
prevent, and deter such arbitrary employer conduct,9 ° applies in the
public sector not only to laws enacted by state legislatures but also to
more individualized and even routine decisionmaking by personnel
managers, supervisors, and government agencies. 91 State legislative
rules sanctioning the arbitrariness of mandatory retirement have survived rational basis review, but the Equal Protection Clause need not
as a result permit individual state employers to invoke such stereotypes

88. See, e.g., Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314-15, nn. 7-8 (relying on arduous physical
challenges facing uniformed police in upholding mandatory retirement); Vance, 440 U.S.
at 101, 103 (relying on critical foreign policy role played by foreign service employees and
also hazards and wear and tear of extended overseas duty in upholding mandatory retirement). Lower courts have rightly understood that they can invalidate age discrimination
by state agencies on rational basis grounds after Murgia and Vance. See, e.g., Indus. Claim
Appeals Office of Colo. v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62, 66-70 (Colo. 1996) (invalidating State's
refusal to pay workers' compensation benefits for permanent total disability beyond age
65); Gault v. Garrison, 569 F.2d 993, 996-97 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945
(1979) (invalidating mandatory retirement of public school teachers).
89. See generally Employment Problems of Older Workers: Hearings on H.R. 274
et al., Before the House Committee on Education and Labor, 89th Cong. (1965) (containing nine days of testimony and submissions); Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the
Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th
Cong. (1967) (containing three days of testimony and submissions); Hearings on H.R.
3651 et al., Before the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 90th Cong. (1967) (containing twelve days of testimony and submissions); The Older American Worker: Age Discriminationin Employment, Report of the
Secretary of Labor to the Congress Under Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(1965); H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 2 (1967) (discussing scope of congressional concern for
problems of age discrimination in employment).
90. See supra note 76 (reciting congressional finding and purpose).
91. See, e.g., Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State Coll., 702 F.2d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 1983);
Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 637 F. Supp. 903, 907 (D. Md. 1986).
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and generalizations whenever they fix terms and conditions of employment for older workers. More than three decades after the ADEA's enactment, common sense and social science research support Congress's
initial conclusions that arbitrary stereotypes and generalizations-not
hostile or negative feelings towards older people-are at the root of
unequal treatment in the workplace. 92 The Court in Kimel was unwilling to accord meaningful recognition to Congress's special legislative
competence in identifying this threat to equality and then acting to
limit its consequences.
3. Section Five and Legislative History
As indicated, a key part of the majority's analysis involved reviewing the legislative record to determine whether Congress has sufficiently identified a problem justifying preventive section five action.
The Court's tone in conducting this review is one of deep skepticism.
The majority dismisses petitioners' arguments from the legislative record as no more than "isolated sentences" that are "cobble[d] together
from a decade's worth of congressional reports and floor debates."9 3 The
Court concludes that the extension of the ADEA to millions of state
government employees was "an unwarranted response to a perhaps
inconsequential problem." 94 In concluding that age discrimination by
state employers was "perhaps inconsequential" in the 1970s, the Court
expressly challenges statements to the contrary by a key legislative
proponent in Congress 95 and documented findings to the contrary by
96
the state of California.
Kimel's skeptical scrutiny of the ADEA legislative record signals a
remarkable change in perspective. The Court in prior decades has sustained section five legislation without expecting Congress to produce
the kind of legislative findings demanded in Kimel.9 ' Even in City of
92. See Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act at Thirty:
Where It's Been, Where It Is Today, Where It's Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 618-20,
677-84 (1997). See generally Laura H. Krieger, The Contents of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 1161 (1995); Barbara F. Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Discrimination:ResearchAgenda for the Twenty-First Century, 29 CONTEMP. Soc. 319 (2000).
93. Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 649.
94. Id. at 648-49.
95. See id. at 649 (questioning validity of Senator Bentsen's statements on the floor
that state and local governments were discriminating against the elderly in their employment practices).
96. See id. (questioning findings on age discrimination in public agencies reported
to the House in a study commissioned by California legislature). See Ray, supra note 38
(manuscript at 10-11, on file with author).
97. See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 652-56, 669 & n.9 (upholding congressional invalidation of state statutes that required literacy in English as a condition of voting,
based on hypothesized discrimination against Spanish-speaking minority which dissent
noted was without any support in legislative record); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 132
(1980) (upholding Congress's power to require states to pay attorneys' fees in certain
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Boerne, where Congress's creation of new substantive rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment triggered a closer review of the RFRA legisfindings are not typically
lative record, the Court noted that legislative
98
required in the section five setting.
To be sure, the 1974 legislative record contains few detailed findings of arbitrary age discrimination by state employers. That, however,
is hardly surprising: the Court's section five decisions at the time did
not encourage-much less, demand-the creation of such a record, and
the ADEA extension was but a small part of a larger statute dealing
with wage and hour matters. 99 In this regard, the ADEA legislative
record addressing unconstitutional discrimination by state employers
is at least comparable to the record made two years earlier that supTitle VII's ban on gender discrimination to the
ported extending
10 0
States.
Moreover, the absence of a detailed record for 50 States' employers
does not mean Congress acted on a whim in 1974. The extensive legislative findings of arbitrary discrimination by private employers were
less than a decade old when Congress extended coverage, and half the
states still had no age discrimination laws at all for public employers. ' 0 '
Yet the Court in Kimel asserts that the ADEA private sector findings
are simply irrelevant to the posited existence of arbitrary discrimi-

circumstances with no reference to congressional findings of a pattern of unconstitutional
state conduct).
98. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531-32.
99. See Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(l)-(4), 88 Stat 55, 78-80 (1974) (featuring 29
sections, of which 28 address FLSA wage and hour issues). Indeed, the legislative history
suggests that the omission of government workers from the ADEA seven years earlier
was due primarily to the fact that most government employees were not covered by the
FLSA at that time and responsibility for ADEA enforcement was to be carried out by the
same agency personnel who enforce the FLSA. See S. REP. No. 93-690, at 55 (1974).
100. Compare, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 3651 et al. Before the General Subcommittee
on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 90th Cong. 166-69 (1967)
(reprinting summary of findings from study commissioned by California legislature that
recites specific examples of arbitrary and intentional age discrimination by government
employers) with Hearings on H.R. 1746 Before the General Subcommittee on Labor of
the House Committee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong. 468-69 (1971) (reprinting
statement of the League of Women Voters, asserting that "[p]ersistent and distinct [sex]
discriminatory practices have been found in state and local personnel systems"). See
generally H.R. REP. No. 92-238 (1971) (containing no discussion of state employers engaging in sex discrimination); 117 CONG. REC. 31958-85, 32088-114 (1971) (containing
no discussion in House floor debate of state employers engaging in sex discrimination);
118 CONG. REc. 4907-49 (1972) (containing no discussion in Senate floor debate of state
employers engaging in sex discrimination). See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 n.9 (1977) (discussing minimal legislative record that accompanied
1972 extension of Title VII to include ban on religious discrimination).
101. See Kimel, Appendix to Brief for Respondents, la-25a (reporting that 24 states
had no age discrimination laws applicable to public employers when Congress extended
the ADEA).
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nation by state employers.1 0 2 This assertion is especially hard to swallow. In the 1960s and 1970s, union strength in the private sector meant
that collectively bargained seniority systems provided substantial protections to millions of older blue collar employees. Arbitrary age discrimination was a more threatening presence in the white collar work10 3
force, principally among professionals, managers, and bureaucrats.
These occupational categories are equally if not more prevalent for public employers,1 0 4 and it would surely have been reasonable for Congress
to conclude that state employers mistreated their older workers in
many of the same ways as private employers.
As a policymaking body, Congress legislates repeatedly in areas of
national concern such as age discrimination in employment. Committees and members draw on their institutional and individual experiences to justify more efficient lawmaking without resorting to redundant hearings or extended debate. To regard the brief 1974 legislative
history as the entire "record" underlying the ADEA's extension "isessentially... [to] treat Congress as if it were a lower federal court," and
thereby "erect an
artificial barrier to full understanding of the legisla10 5
tive process."
In the end, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the Kimel Court
viewed the ADEA legislative record as a straw man. The majority's
distinctly unsympathetic approach to legislative history in the Eleventh Amendment setting is consistent with views expressed by many
of the same Justices when resolving disputes over statutory meaning.
Several members of the Kimel majority have voiced grave doubts about
relying on legislative history at all when interpreting statutes.10 6 Over
102. Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 649 (dismissing argument that Congress found substantial
age discrimination in private sector as "beside the point").
103. ADEA litigation typically involved mid-level professionals, salesmen, and managers. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977) (involving airline
pilot); Price v. Md. Cas. Co., 561 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1977) (involving insurance salesman);
Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) affd in part,rev'd in
part, and remanded, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979) (involving clothing designer); Coates v.
Nat'l Cash Register Co., 433 F. Supp. 655 (W.D. Va. 1977) (involving engineer).
104. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (involving mid-level manager
in state agency); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980) (involving public school
teacher). In 1979, state and local governments employed nearly 2.8 million administrators, professionals, technicians, paraprofessionals, and office/clerical workers, comprising
60.9% of their combined workforce. In 1997, these five categories of white collar workers
comprised 63.3% of the state and local government workforce, a total of 3.3 million employees. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1981 (102d ed.) at 308; STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1999 (119th ed.) at 339.

105. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 502 (Powell J. concurring).
106. See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia &
Thomas, JJ) (rejecting Court's use of legislative history as a tool for interpreting Mine
Safety and Health Act); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 100 n.** (1993) (Scalia &
Thomas, JJ. rejecting Court's use of legislative history as a tool for interpreting the Kansas Act); Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 470-73 (1989)
(Kennedy, J.) (rejecting Court's use of legislative history as a tool for interpreting Federal
Advisory Committee Act).
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the last 15 years, the Court as a whole has become heavily focused on
parsing the literal terms of each statute while minimizing the role of
legislative intent. 10 7 Such individual reservations and collective inattentions may have contributed to the harshness of the Court's position
toward Congress.
D. The Consequences of Kimel
1. ADEA Litigation
What does the Court's decision mean for the future of ADEA litigation? To begin with, Kimel leaves a number of matters unaffected.
ADEA claims brought against private employers remain fully justified
under the Commerce Clause. Further, the Eleventh Amendment does
not protect local governments or school boards; unlike the "state action"
concept under the Fourteenth Amendment, immunity applies only to
the States themselves.'
As for state defendants, under the Court's
venerable Ex Parte Young °9 decision, private individuals may continue
to sue state officials for prospective injunctive relief from a violation of
federal law. 0 They may even bring an action against state officials for
monetary damages, provided the officials are sued in their individual
capacities and the relief is sought from them personally rather than
from the state treasury."'
In addition, the Eleventh Amendment protects only against private
actions; the federal government may still sue state agencies or employers under the ADEA. 112 This raises interesting policy questions. The
EEOC would need an enormous increase in resources to enable it to
take up all damages actions against the States that currently are
brought by private individuals. Such an increase seems unlikely to ma107. See generallyRichard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court'sNew Hypertextualism:
An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 CoLuM. L.
REV. 749 (1995); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Futureof the Chevron Doctrine,
72 WASH. U. L. Q. 351 (1994).
108. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756.
109. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
110. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73; Alden, 527 U.S. at 756-57.
111. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 29-31 (1991); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
237-38 (1974). In Luder v. Endicott, 86 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865-66 (W.D. Wis. 2000), a
district court recently held that state penitentiary officials engaged in employer-type
activities could be sued in their individual capacities for monetary relief under the FLSA
and that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar such claims against individuals when
they act as state employers. In such circumstances, individuals acting as employers who
are found liable and who do not possess official capacity qualified immunity may also
lack sufficient assets to satisfy the judgment. Assuming that a state statute provides for
indemnification, the lower court's holding in Luder raises the prospect that a State would
pay the same amount it is precluded from paying directly under the Eleventh Amendment. But see Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a
Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1016-21 (2000) (discussing ways in which injunctions, damage actions against state officials in their individual capacities, and indemnification statutes all provide considerably less relief than a regime premised on direct
governmental liability).
112. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), (c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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terialize even in today's era of budget surpluses. 1 13 Yet, if state law
protections turn out to be inadequate, an ironic result of Kimel could
be more intrusive federal enforcement in matters affecting state sovereignty. Moreover, should Congress decide that it wants to encourage
states' compliance with federal age discrimination standards, it may
have other means at its disposal besides litigation. One possibility
would be to condition access to certain related federal
funds on a State's
14
agreement to abide by all ADEA requirements.
Finally, the Kimel Court noted that state employees remain able
to recover money damages from their employers under age discrimination laws enacted by the states themselves." 5 These state statutes,
however, provide uneven protections to older state employees. Kentucky's statute authorizes age-related reductions in employee benefits
that are not permitted under federal law.116 Minnesota law permits
mandatory retirement at age 70, pursuant to an employer's published
retirement policy." 7 Mississippi law makes no provision for attorneys'
fees when state employees prevail in an age discrimination action." 8
Such disparities in state law protections were considerably greater
before the ADEA extension of 1974. Of the 26 states that had laws
covering public employees, 11 9 some provided for modest fines but no
damages, 120 others wholly exempted certain state practices, 121 and still
others established a higher standard of proof than is required under
the ADEA.122 It remains to be seen whether states will revert to earlier
113. Direct funding of litigation against the states would not appear to be politically
popular. In addition, the EEOC has never been especially well regarded or trusted by
Congress.
114. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Congress might, for instance,
withhold federal training grants or grants to assist older Americans until a state provides
sufficient evidence that it is substantially complying with the ADEA.
115. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 650, n.* (listing statutes).
116. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.110(2)(e) (1998) (language allowing employers to
"observ[e] the terms of a bona fide ... employee benefit plan ... which is not a subterfuge"; identical language removed by Congress from the ADEA in 1990).
117. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.02 subd.6, 181.81 (1998). See Dorn v. Peterson, 512
N.W.2d 902, 904-05 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (applying mandatory retirement exception to
private employee claims).
118. MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-9-131 - 132 (1992) (permitting judicial review by state
workers from appeals board decisions "in the manner provided by law," i.e., with no
attorney fee awards).
119. See supra note 101 (reporting that 24 states had no laws applicable to public
employees).
120. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.title 19, § 710 (1970) (prohibiting age-based discrimination against employees between 45 and 65 years of age; violators fined $200 for first
breach and $500 for second). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.043 (1992) (prohibiting agebased employment discrimination by state boards or officials without providing for any
enforcement).
121. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 112.043 (1992) (prohibiting State from engaging in
age discrimination in employment "[u]nless age restrictions have been specifically established through published specifications for a position, available to the public").
122. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420.1 (1972) (prohibiting discrimination against
employees between the ages of 40 and 64 "solely on the ground of age"); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 112.043 (1992) (prohibiting age discrimination against state employees "solely on the
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practices that are plainly inconsistent with the ADEA, such as extending mandatory retirement to most state workers or excluding older employees from certain fringe benefits.12 Seniors in general are a formidable political constituency, but this may be less true when the voting
bloc is seniors who are public employees. Further, states face many
weighty demands on their fiscal resources, and economizing on the
backs of state bureaucracy would seem to be harmless-perhaps even
popular-in political terms.
2. Eleventh Amendment Developments
With respect to the constitutional implications of Kimel, the Court
has crossed the Rubicon into core civil rights territory, and states have
begun lining up to claim additional Eleventh Amendment immunities.
The Court agreed to decide next term whether Congress has the section
five authority to lift States' immunity from cases brought under the
Americans with Disabilities Act.1 24 The circuits are split on the validity
of ADA abrogation, 125 though a post-Kimel decision authored by Judge
Easterbrook in the Seventh Circuit concluded that Kimel's ADEA analysis controls.1 26 Specifically, Judge Easterbrook emphasized that ADA
proscriptions on employer conduct go well beyond what would be prohibited under Fourteenth Amendment rational basis analysis and also
that the ADA legislative record does27 not demonstrate States were engaged in irrational discrimination.'
The constitutionality of abrogation under the Equal Pay Act (EPA)
and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) are being litigated in
the lower courts. Congress's section five authority under the EPA was
recently upheld by the Eleventh Circuit as a congruent and proporbasis of age"). Compare, e.g., Cuddy v. Carmen, 694 F.2d 853, 857 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(stating settled ADEA rule that plaintiff must prove age was a determining factor in
adverse job action, but need not demonstrate that age was the sole motivating factor)
and Golomb v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 688 F.2d 547, 551-52 (7th Cir. 1982)
(same).
123. For an example of the latter, see Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v.
Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989) (upholding Ohio's disability retirement scheme, which provided inter alia that public employees who became disabled before age 60 received at
least 30% of their final average salary while those 60 and over who became disabled were
not similarly protected). Congress overrode Betts in 1990 when it passed the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act.
124. See Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. Of Trs., 193 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 68 U.S.L.W. 3491 (U.S. Apr. 17, 2000) (No. 99-1240). The Court
granted certiorari on this issue in two other cases this term; the grants were dismissed
after the parties settled. See Alsbrook v. Ark., 120 S. Ct. 1265 (2000); Florida Dep't of
Corrections v. Dickson, 120 S. Ct. 1236 (2000).
125. Compare, e.g., Coolbaugh v. La., 136 F.3d 430,438 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
525 U.S. 819 (1998) (holding ADA is valid abrogation) and Clark v. California, 123 F.3d
1267, 1269-71 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998) (same) with Brown v.
North Carolina Div. of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d 698, 706-08 (4th Cir. 1999) (holdingADA
not valid abrogation).
126. Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colleges and Univs. for Northeastern Ill.
Univ., 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000).
127. See 207 F.3d at 948-52.
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tional response to the problem of wage discrimination. 12' Although the
Court acknowledged that Congress had made no findings with respect
to wage discrimination in the public sector, it opined that "such [absence of] findings [is] not fatal because gender discrimination is a problem of national import." 129 Congress, of course, thought that age discrimination was a problem of national import, but the court of appeals
may be forgiven for absorbing from Kimel the teaching that courts alone
should decide which forms of status discrimination engaged in by state
employers are important enough to warrant section five protection.
While the EPA has fared well in the lower courts, 30 the FMLA has
not. The Second Circuit and a number of district courts have concluded
that application of the FMLA to the States exceeded Congress's enforcement powers under section five; several of these cases have been decided since Kimel.13 ' These recent cases found a lack of congruence and
proportionality based in part on Congress's failure to identify "widespread and pervasive evidence of gender-based leave discrimination in
132
the workplace."
One should expect the Supreme Court in the next several years to
rule on the constitutionality of abrogating states' immunity under each
of these civil rights statutes and perhaps Title VII as well. At the same
time, given the practical and constitutional importance of Kimel, it is
worth noting the thinness of the Court's majority and the vehemence
of the four dissenters. In Kimel, Justice Stevens (for himself and
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) made clear his continuing profound disagreement with the Court's recent forays in the Eleventh
Amendment area. 1 33 The dissenters set forth a very different conception of federalism, grounded in the procedural and political safeguards
accompanying national legislation rather than the judge-made doctrine
128. Hundertmark v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 205 F.3d 1272 (1 lth Cir. 2000).
129. See 205 F.3d at 1276. The per curiam opinion in Hundertmark was issued by a
panel that included Judge Cox, who had concluded in Kimel that Congress lacked section
five power to abrogate immunity under the ADEA. See supra n.58 and accompanying
text.
130. In addition to Hundertmark, cases decided after Boerne but before Kimel include O'Sullivan v. Minnesota, 191 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 1999); Anderson v. State Univ. of
N.Y, 169 F.3d 117, 118 (2d Cir. 1999), vacated, 120 S. Ct. 929 (2000); Ussery v. State of
La., 150 F.3d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1998); Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 150 F.3d 706, 717 (7th
Cir. 1998), vacated, 120 S. Ct. 928 (2000). Of course, the circuits heavily favored the
validity of ADEA abrogation during this period as well.
131. See Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2000); Laro v. New Hampshire, No. CV98-547-M (unpublished) (D.N.H. March 29, 2000); Philbrick v. Univ. of Conn., 90 F. Supp.
2d 195 (D. Conn. 2000). For pre-Kimel decisions invalidating FMLA abrogation, see, e.g.,
Kilvitis v. County of Luzerne, 52 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408, 419 (M.D. Pa. 1999), McGregor v.
Goord, 18 F. Supp. 2d 204 (N.D.NY 1998); Thomson v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 5 F. Supp.
2d 574, 577 (S.D. Ohio 1998). See generally, Ray, supranote 38 (manuscript at 18-34, on
file with author) (arguing that both Equal Pay Act and FMLA are valid exercises of
Congress's section five abrogation authority under Kimel approach).
132. Philbrick,90 F. Supp. 2d at 201. See Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d at 68-69.
133. Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 650-54.
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of sovereign immunity.134 It is apparent that Justice Stevens and his
three colleagues will overrule the Seminole Tribe line of cases if they
are able to secure a fifth vote. This issue has yet to resonate with the
general public, but the next President should have a key role in determining whether the Court will continue on its controversial
Eleventh
35
Amendment journey or instead abandon the enterprise.1
III. Minimum Workplace Standards Cases
The Court decided two cases this Term interpreting statutes that
provide certain basic workplace standards protections for employees.
In both instances, the Court ruled against the employees' legal position.
136
A. Christensen v. Harris County
The dispute in Christensen concerned public employees' right to
control their own use of compensatory time (comp time) under the
FLSA Amendments of 1985.137 The amendments were a direct response
to the Supreme Court's decision in Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority.' 38 Garciahad reinstated the FLSA as fully applicable to state and local governments, and in the process had removed the
Tenth Amendment from the federalism dialogue. The Court reasoned
that because "[tihe political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated," the judiciary had "no license
to employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty" based on the
39
Tenth Amendment. 1
The political process worked rather well in this instance. While the
Executive Branch twice deferred its enforcement of the newly appli-

134. Id. at 652.
135. See, e.g., Tony Mauro, Split Branches,Little Deference to Congress as the Court
Curbs Federal Power, LEGAL TImEs, May 22, 2000 at 1, 8 (suggesting that Rehnquist
Court's attacks on congressional authority are likely to be important in future confirmation battles, but for now there has been little political or public attention paid to these
matters).
136. 120 S. Ct. 1655 (2000).
137. FLSA Amendments of 1985, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203,207 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
138. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling prior precedent and holding that the Tenth
Amendment does not prohibit or restrict extension of the FLSA to state and local
employers).
139. Id. at 550, 556. The Court's recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, culminating for the moment in Kimel, may be seen in important respects as an end-run
around the reasoning if not the holding of Garcia. See Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and
Compromise in ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 1006-08 (2000) (arguing for a return to
reliance on the political and procedural safeguards of the national lawmaking process to
protect States' sovereign immunity); John C. Yoo, The JudicialSafeguardsof Federalism,
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1353-56 (1997) (arguing that Garcia has been effectively overruled and Seminole Tribe played a central role in this development). Cf. Deborah Jones
Merritt, The GuaranteeClause and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988) (positing an autonomy theory of federalism that would reject
both Garcia and the Court's previous Tenth Amendment jurisprudence).
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cable overtime requirements for a total of over six months, 4 ° representatives of public employer and public employee constituencies negotiated with members of Congress to produce a statute that received
4
overwhelming bipartisan support.1 '
The employer groups had urgently sought relief from the fiscal
pressures of having to make overtime payments, especially with respect
to public safety employees who typically work long shifts. 142 The employee groups had worried that creating a statutory comp time exception to the FLSA's basic rules guaranteeing premium pay for overtime
might well invite employer abuse, as employees could accrue endless
hours of compensatory time and never be able to use them.143 The FLSA
amendments addressed both sides' concerns by allowing public employers to award comp time in lieu of overtime pay provided that certain
specified conditions were met.144 Compensatory time may be provided
only pursuant to an agreement reached between employer and employee.' 4 5 In addition, the 1985 amendments furnish specific protections for employees, giving them the rights to use accrued comp time
within reasonable limits, 146 to be paid in cash for any hours accrued
140. See S. Hrg. 450, Before Subcommittee on Economic Goals and Intergovernmental Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, 99th Cong. 4-5 (1985) (statement of
Deputy Undersecretary Susan R. Meisinger) (reporting that the Department of Labor
was deferring initiation of FLSA investigations with respect to state and local government employers for six months-from April 15, when Supreme Court issued its mandate
in Garciauntil October 15-to allow government employers time to bring their pay practices into compliance); 131 CONG. REC. 28986 (1985) (Sen. Wilson) (referring to the Department of Labor's further extension of implementation date until November 1).
141. See 131 CONG. REC. 28983-84 (1985) (Sen. Nickles) (introducing letters of support for legislative compromise on October 24, 1985 from U.S. Conference of Mayors,
National League of Cities, National Association of Counties, National Conference of State
Legislators, and AFL-CIO); id. at 28983 (Sen. Nickles); id. at 28984 (Sen. Metzenbaum);
id. at 28988 (Sen. Hatch and Sen. Ford); id. at 29218-19 (Rep. Murphy); id. at 2921920 (Rep. Jeffords). The bill passed by voice vote in the Senate and on the suspension
calendar in the House. Id. at 28992, 29226.
142. See S. Hrg. 1570, Before Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on
Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 83-84 (1985) (statement of Cleveland
Mayor George V. Voinovich, representing National League of Cities) [hereinafter 1985
Senate Hearings]; Hearing on Fair Labor Standards Act Before Subcommittee on Labor
Standards of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7
(1985) (statement of New York City Mayor Edward Koch).
143. See 1985 Senate Hearings, supra note 142, at 156-57, 160 (statement of Al
Bilik, Executive Director, State and Local Division, AFL-CIO Public Employee Department); id. at 375, 377 (statement of Steve McCain, Treasurer, Fraternal Order of Police,
Oklahoma City); id. at 561, 568-69 (statement of Edward J. Blasie, President, Detectives
Endowment Association, New York City).
144. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(1) (allowing employees to receive compensatory time at
a rate of one and one-half hours for every hour of overtime worked); id. at § 207(o)(2) to
(5) (setting further conditions governing receipt and use of compensatory time).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(2).
146. Id. at § 207(o)(5) (authorizing employees' use of comp time upon request, so
long as "the use does not unduly disrupt the operations of the public agency").
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above a fixed ceiling, 147 and148to cash out all accrued comp time upon
termination of employment.
In Christensen, 127 deputy sheriffs employed by a county in Texas
had agreed to accept compensatory time in lieu of cash. 149 Later, in an
effort to reduce accumulated comp time, the county set certain limits
on how much could be accrued, and required its deputy sheriffs to take
time off whenever they approached these limits. 5 ° The county's compelled use policy was not contained in the employer-employee agreements, and the Labor Department had advised the county by letter that
such a policy was only permissible under the FLSA if included in the
agreements. 1 5 ' The Supreme Court sided with the county, holding that
nothing in the FLSA or its implementation regulations prohibited a
a policy that requires employees to use
public employer from adopting
52
up their compensatory time.
Christensen nicely illustrates the potential for indeterminacy in
formal language arguments that recently have shaped the Court's approach to statutory interpretation. The 1985 amendments expressly
restrict employers' ability to prohibitthe use of accrued comp time, but
are silent as to the permissibility of employers compelling such use.
The majority through Justice Thomas and the dissent through Justice
Stevens each sought to take advantage of this congressional silence,
asserting divergent default rules.
For the majority, the appropriate background norm was that an employer should be able to prescribe workplace rules absent specific authority to the contrary. In promoting this norm, Justice Thomas relied
heavily on the inclusio unius canon 153 as applied to section 207(o)(5)
governing employee use of comp time. The canon's application signified
to the majority that an employer may not deny an employee's request to
use comp time for any reason other than the one expressed in section
207(o)(5), i.e., that the use would unduly disrupt operations. 154 The dis147. Id. at § 207(o)(3) (requiring employers to pay cash for all overtime hours worked
once employees have accrued either 240 or, for specified occupations, 480 hours of unused
comp time).
148. Id. at § 207(o)(4) (requiring that employees leaving employment be paid for
unused comp time at their final regular rate of pay, or their average regular rate over
last three years of employment, whichever is higher).
149. Christensen, 120 S. Ct. at 1659.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1661-63.
153. The canon of construction inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (the inclusion of
one thing means the exclusion of alternative things) has been invoked more often by the
Court since the late 1980s. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE AND PHILIP J. FRICKEY, CASES AND

MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 639 (2d ed. 1996); William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism,
37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 664 (1990).
154. 120 S. Ct. at 1661.
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sent, on the other hand, viewed the applicable background norm as
giving employees the right to overtime pay absent specific terms to the
contrary in an employer-employee agreement. 1 55 The agreement, according to Justice Stevens, is what governs both availability and use of
compensatory time; the statutory protections found in section 207(o)
address certain anticipated threats to the operation of a comp time
regime, but any further conditions or qualifications must be contained
in the agreement. 5 6 Consistent with this background understanding,
the dissent's position with respect to section 207(o) was essentially that
an employer may not limit an employee's use of comp time on grounds
other than those set forth in the section, unless done pursuant to the
terms of an agreement with the employee.
The plausibility of these competing linguistic perspectives might
have led a different Court to seek guidance from contextual sources.
Congress in 1985 created a narrow exception to an overtime pay rule
that had been national law for nearly half a century. The thrust of the
three statutory conditions accompanying this exception was to provide
employees with certain freedom or control over their newly created
comp time accounts. 157 It was at least puzzling under these circumstances for the Court to conclude that residual power over the accounts
rests with employers.
The legislative history accompanying this compromise statute
suggests that employee control was precisely what Congress had in
mind. For example, in discussing an employee's right to cash out accrued comp time upon termination, the Senate Report observed that
rates of pay tend to increase over time, and, accordingly, "it is anticipated that many employers will have a fiscal incentive to allow for the
use of accrued compensatory time." 5 ' One wonders why the committee would bother to adopt such permissive language if employers
could always compel employees to use up comp time because of fiscal
constraints. During floor debate, the principal House sponsor expressed his understanding that the bill's accrual provisions would enable employees to bank their comp time "and claim it at any later
time ... during the course of their employment."'5 9 The Senate and
House proceedings contain numerous other statements from
members of both parties reflecting a determination to protect employee flexibility, with no suggestion that unilateral employer action

155. Id. at 1665 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
156. Id. at 1666.
157. Compare Heaton v. Moore, 43 F.3d 1176, 1179-80 (8th Cir. 1994) (referring to
employees " 'bank[ing]' compensatory time in what amounts to an employee-owned savings account of compensatory time").
158. S. REP. No. 99-159, at 12 (1985) (emphasis added).
159. 131 CONG. REC. 30989 (1985) (Rep. Murphy) (emphasis added).
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was contemplated. 60 As previously suggested, however, the current
Court is disinclined to use legislative history or purpose analysis to help
resolve the interpretive uncertainties that accompany a silent text.
The Christensendecision has important economic consequences in
light of the budgetary pressures traditionally faced by state and local
governments. Public employers now have considerable power to limit
their employees' accrual of comp time, and thereby to minimize the
prospect of delayed cash payments made at inconvenient (not merely
"unduly disrupt[ive]"' 6 1 ) times or at higher late-career wage rates.
Yet the Court, intriguingly, left open the possibility that its holding
could be overturned by subsequent executive branch action. Justice
Thomas's majority opinion acknowledged that Chevron-style deference
would be owed to a Labor Department regulation that limited forced
62
use of comp time in the absence of an employer-employee agreement. 1
The majority was not prepared to accord similar deference to the Department's opinion letter issued outside formally delegated lawmaking
powers.' 63 Justice Souter, in a short concurrence, joined the majority's
opinion on the assumption that it allowed the Secretary to prepare regulations taking the very position set forth in its opinion letter.164 Thus,
the Court has in effect invited the Labor Department to codify in regulatory form the position adopted by the dissent.' 6 5
160. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-331, at 23 (1985) (emphasis added) (stating that
employees should not be forced to accept more compensatory time "than an employer
realistically and in good faith expects to be able to grant to that employee if he or she
requests it"); 131 CONG. REC. 28984 (Sen. Metzenbaum, Democrat from Ohio, stating bill
"provides public employees with meaningful FLSA protections for any overtime worked");
id. at 29219 (Rep. Jeffords, Republican from Vermont, stating "accrued time would be
limited, largely as a protection for employees" and that "within the limits set by the bill,
employers and employees would be free [together] to design or maintain their own
compensatory time systems"). The FLSA amendments were enacted by a Republicancontrolled Senate and a Democrat-controlled House.
161. 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)(5) (allowing employers to limit employee comp time use that
unduly disrupts operations).
162. 120 S. Ct. at 1662.
163. Id. at 1662-63. The letter was entitled only to respect insofar as it had persuasive force under the Court's decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
(1944). Id. at 1663
This subsidiary but important administrative law question of whether Chevron applies to less formal agency interpretations created additional divisions within the Court.
Justice Scalia concurred only in the judgment, expressing his view that Chevron deference had superseded Skidmore as a general matter, but that the Secretary's position here
was unreasonable under Chevron. Id. at 1663-65. Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg
(but not Justice Stevens) wrote a separate dissent, arguing that the Skidmore doctrine
retained vitality even after Chevron, but that the agency's position was persuasive under
Skidmore as well as being reasonable under Chevron. Id. at 1667-68.
164. Id. at 1663.
165. Justice Scalia obviously would reject such a rule (see n.163 supra), but it
would enjoy support from the three dissenters and Justice Souter. Given that Justice
Thomas and the three other Justices who joined his opinion (Rehnquist, Kennedy,
O'Connor) chose to rely on the lesser deference due a letter in rejecting the executive
branch position, it seems likely that one or more of them would conclude that a duly
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B. United States v. Locke
A controversy involving federal anti-pollution statutes that regulate oil tankers appears an unlikely candidate for inclusion as a labor
and employment decision. Locke, however, may be seen as an example
of the growing interface between environmental and labor interests on
national policy matters, and also of the developing tendency by the
states to extend regulatory labor standards beyond what the national
government has prescribed.
Responding to highly publicized oil spills at sea, Congress in 1972
and again in 1990 enacted legislation providing for detailed regulation
of oil tanker design and operations, including personnel qualifications
and staffing of these vessels.1 67 The state of Washington, following the
massive Exxon Valdez spill in 1989, enacted regulations that were in
many respects more stringent than comparable federal law.168 Of particular relevance here, the new state regulations imposed a series of
training requirements, work hours limitations, and English language
proficiency standards on tanker crews navigating within Washington's
waters. 169
These state regulations were challenged by a trade association representing most of the world's independently owned tanker fleet. 70 The
district court and Ninth Circuit held that Washington's laws were not
preempted by the federal anti-pollution statutes and did not conflict
with international agreements relating to tanker safety.' 7 ' By the time
the case reached the Supreme Court, the United States had intervened
on the side of the trade association, and 15 countries had submitted
amicus briefs arguing that Washington's regulations were endangering
reciprocity agreements and thereby threatening global maritime commerce. 172 On the other side, 20 states submitted an amicus brief insisting that prevention of oil pollution is at the heart of the States'
police power and should be preserved as appropriately supplementing
73
federal efforts.'
promulgated Labor Department regulation is reasonable under Chevron even if not
persuasive under Skidmore.
166. 120 S. Ct. 1135 (2000).
167. Id. at 1140, 1144 (describing the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1221-1236 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,33 U.S.C.
§§ 2706-2761 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
168. Id. at 1140, 1142.
169. Id. at 1153 (listing personnel policies in Appendix to Court's opinion).
170. Id. at 1142.
171. See Int'l Ass'n of Indep. Tanker Owners v. Locke, 148 F.3d 1053, 1058, 106169 (9th Cir. 1998).
172. See Amicus Brief of the Governments of Beig., Den., Fin., Fr., F.R.G., Greece,
Italy, Japan, Neth., Nor., Port., Spain, Swed., and U.K, 3-4 (summarizing argument);
Amicus Brief of the Government of Canada, 5 (summarizing argument).
173. Amicus Brief of the States of Alaska, Cal., Conn., Fla., Haw., Ill., La., Me.,
Mass., Miss., Nev., N.J., N.Y, N.C., Ohio, Okla., Or., R.I., S.C., Utah, and the Commonwealth of the N. Mariana Islands, 5 (summarizing argument).
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The dispute in Locke, like those in Kimel and Christensen,required
the Court to address an aspect of ongoing tensions between state and
federal interests. This time the Court came down firmly on the side of
the national government. Without reaching questions of international
law, a unanimous Court held that the State's employment-related reg17 4
ulations were preempted by the Ports and Waterways Safety Act.
Congress, in certain parts of that statute, had preserved the States'
traditional power to regulate conditions in local ports and waters absent conflict with federal rules.' 75 But the directly applicable provisions
of the Act, governing tanker "operation, equipping, personnel qualification, and manning;" reflected Congress's determination to impose
uniform national rules and thereby oust the states altogether from the
176
field.
The Court's holding and analysis based on "field preemption" are
not terribly surprising from a labor law perspective. Congress in the
NLRA and ERISA sought to impose uniform national standards regulating aspects of the private workplace. When faced with preemption
challenges premised on the putative reach of those regulatory schemes,
the Supreme Court has generally viewed the two statutes as substantially occupying their respective fields, and has foreclosed many state
law actions and remedies pertaining to labor relations and retirement
77
or welfare benefits. 1
The Court in Locke remanded most of Washington's tanker safety
regulations so that the lower courts could decide which, if any, might
not be preempted. 17 State laws may survive only if they are determined to be "of limited extraterritorial effect and necessary to address
the peculiarities" of the State's own waters. 1 79 Basic training and language proficiency requirements obviously did not meet this test, as they
inevitably affect tanker operations outside territorial waters. One

174. 120 S. Ct. at 1150-51.
175. Id. at 1148-49.
176. See id. at 1144, 1149 (quoting PWSA, §3703(a)).
177. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (holding that NLRA preempts state tort damages action against union); Wis. Dep't of Indus.,
Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282 (1986) (holding that NLRA preempts
state procurement restrictions imposed against firms that repeatedly violate federal labor
law); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142-45 (1990) (holding that ERISA
§ 502 preempts state law claim of wrongful discharge to prevent attainment of benefits
under ERISA-covered plan); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (holding
that ERISA § 502 preempts state common law remedy for bad faith denial of medical
claims). But see Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (holding that basic
mental health care benefits provided pursuant to state insurance regulation are not preempted under ERISA or NLRA). Unlike the NLRA and ERISA, many federal workplace
statutes broadly preserve state law rights and remedies. See, e.g., Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-7 (1994); ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 633 (1999); WARN Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2105 (1999).
178. 120 S. Ct. at 1152.
179. Id.
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should not expect other workplace standards regulation by the states
to fare better under this federal statutory scheme.
IV. ADEA and Proof Requirements in Employment
Discrimination Actions
In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,Inc., s° the Court gave
employees an important victory. Addressing a substantial split in the
circuits regarding how much circumstantial evidence a plaintiff needs
in order to prevail in an employment discrimination action, the Court
made it considerably easier for employees who establish a primafacie
case of discrimination to get to a jury.
A. Background to the Reeves Decision
Litigated disputes involving alleged age, race, or sex bias on the
job seldom include "smoking gun" evidence of discriminatory motive.
Moreover, because employers rarely admit to such bias, the great majority of employment discrimination cases are resolved on the basis of
circumstantial evidence from which a fact finder might reasonably
infer that an employer intended to discriminate. Since the early
1970s, these discriminatory treatment cases have been tried under
the Court's McDonnell Douglas evidentiary framework, which allows
employees to prove 1their case through inferences drawn from circum8
stantial evidence.
Under the three-stage McDonnell Douglas approach, a terminated
employee alleging an ADEA violation must first establish a prima facie
case, demonstrating that he was a member of the protected class when
fired, that he was otherwise qualified for the position he had held, and
82
that the employer replaced him with someone substantially younger.1
The burden then shifts to the employer to produce evidence that the
183
employee was discharged for a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.
In reply, the employee retains a chance to prove that the legitimate
reason offered by the employer
was not the real reason he was fired,
84
but rather a mere pretext.1
180. 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).
181. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Court has established and refined its burden-shifting inferential model through a series of cases, starting
with McDonnellDouglas. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983); St. Mary's Honor Ctr.
v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). While the model has been developed through decisions
applying Title VII, lower courts have routinely applied it to ADEA and ADA cases as
well. The Court in Reeves, as it had done several terms earlier, acknowledged this widespread practice and assumed arguendothat the McDonnell Douglas framework was fully
applicable in the ADEA context. See 120 S. Ct. 2105-06 (citing O'Connor v. Consol. Coin
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996)).
182. See Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2106; O'Connor,517 U.S. at 313.
183. See Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2106; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. This is a burden of
production, not persuasion. 450 U.S. at 256-60.
184. See Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2106; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08.

HeinOnline -- 16 Lab. Law. 188 2000-2001

The Changing Complexion of Workplace Law
The principal question presented in Reeves was, what next? Assuming an employee demonstrates that the employer's stated reason
for discharging him was pretextual, may the trier-of-fact find unlawful
discrimination based on that showing of pretext combined with the employee's prima facie case? Or, must the employee produce additional
evidence that his age motivated the adverse employment decision? This
matter of what follows from proof of pretext had been previously addressed by the Court on several occasions. With the benefit of hindsight,
those discussions take on a distinctly pendulum-like quality.
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 8 5 a unanimous Court appeared to say that a plaintiff has met her burden of
persuasion when she has shown that the employer's proffered explanation for terminating her was "unworthy of credence." 18 6 In United
States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, the Court began to
edge away from this conclusion.'" The majority opined that once a
prima facie case has been rebutted by the employer's proffered explanation, the factfinder must then treat discrimination just like any other
ultimate question of fact, "decid[ing] which party's explanation of the
employer's motivation it believes."1s8 Justice Blackmun in concurrence,
joined by Justice Brennan, tried to bend the majority back toward the
Court's statement in Burdine, which for him reflected a proper understanding that "the McDonnell Douglas framework requires that a plaintiff prevail when"' 8 9 he has proved pretext. The six Justices in the Aikens majority notably failed to respond.
Several years later, however, in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
a sharply divided Court held that proof of pretext did not entitle plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law.' 90 For the Hicks majority, the fact
that an employment discrimination plaintiff bears the ultimate burden
185. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
186. Id. at 256. The Court's exact words were as follows:
This burden [of proving pretext] now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.
She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer'sproffered explanation is unworthy of credence.
Id. at 256 (emphasis added). This statement was technically only dicta; the case holds
that an employer rebutting a primafacie case has a burden of production, not persuasion.
Id. at 256-57.
187. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
188. Id. at 716.
189. Id. at 717-18 (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun joined the opinion as well
as the judgment in Aikens, thus giving him some standing to comment on its meaning
and scope. Justice Marshall concurred only in the judgment.
190. 509 U.S. 502, 505-25 (1993). The Justices by now openly and forcefully disagreed over the meaning of Burdine, including specifically the language quoted supra at
n.186. See Janice R. Bellace, The Supreme Court's 1992-1993 Term: A Review of Labor
and Employment Law Cases, 9 LAB. LAw. 603, 624-26 (1993).
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of persuasion meant that a factfinder must determine whether unlawful discrimination had occurred, not simply whether the employer's explanation for its actions was credible."'9 In holding that proof of pretext
was not automatically enough to warrant a finding of discrimination,
the Court in Hicks triggered a new debate: whether proof of pretext
alone could ever be enough to justify such a finding. The Court's opinion
included language that pointed in both directions on this issue.' 92 Over
the ensuing six years, a number of circuits adopted the "pretext-plus"
position, i.e., that a plaintiff seeking to prove discriminatory treatment
cannot prevail unless his evidence is sufficient for a jury to find both that
the employer's reason was false and that the true reason was discrimination.'9 3 The pretext-plus standard became a source of reassurance to
employer groups determined to resist unnecessary litigation costs from
weak claims of discrimination, and a cause for alarm among employee
representatives who feared an undermining of the inferential model that
was essential to vindicate congressional antidiscrimination policies.
B. The Court's Decision and Its Consequences
The Supreme Court's lengthy treatment of the evidence in Reeves
reflects the intensely fact-based nature of this legal issue. The case
involved a 57 year old supervisor who had worked for the company for
40 years when he was discharged.' 94 At trial, he established a prima
facie case of age discrimination and his employer offered testimony that
it had fired him because he failed to maintain accurate attendance records for his department. 1 95 Mr. Reeves introduced evidence that his
employer's explanation was pretextual, showing that he had kept accurate records for the employees he supervised, and also showing that
a key management official had made age-biased statements toward
him in the past. 196 Specifically, Reeves testified that several months
before his termination, the manager had told him on one occasion that
he "was so old [he] must have come over on the Mayflower," and, when
criticizing his performance on another occasion, said that he "was too
damn old to do [his] job."' 97 The jury returned a verdict in Reeves's
favor, including a finding of willful age discrimination by the employer; the court awarded compensatory damages, liquidated dam191. See 509 U.S. at 519.
192. Compare,e.g., id. at 511 (stating that "the factfinder's disbelief of the reasons
put forward by the defendant... may, together with the elements of the primafacie case,
suffice to show intentional discrimination"), with id. at 515 (emphasis in original) (stating
that "a reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for discrimination'unless it is shown
both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason").
193. Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2105 (discussing holdings of First, Second, Fourth, and
Fifth Circuits).
194. Id. at 2103.
195. Id. at 2103-04.
196. Id. at 2104.
197. Id. at 2110.
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ages, and front pay totaling nearly $100,000.198 In reversing, the Fifth
Circuit held that although the employee had probably offered sufficient
evidence of pretext, this was not dispositive on the ultimate issue of
whether age had motivated the decision. 199 The court went on to discount the age-biased comments by the employer on the ground that
they "were not made in the direct context of Reeves's termination," and
concluded that Reeves's evidence was not sufficient for a rational jury
200
to find that he had been fired because of his age.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice O'Connor,
reversed the court of appeals' decision and reinstated the jury verdict.
The Court dismissed the pretext-plus standard as "misconceiv[ing] the
evidentiary burden borne by plaintiffs who attempt to prove intentional
discrimination through indirect evidence."2" 1 The uncertainties and
tensions that had divided the Justices in Hicks were nowhere to be
seen. 20 2 In the Reeves Court's view, demonstrating the unworthiness of
an employer's proffered explanation is not only a permissible basis from
which a factfinder may infer discriminatory treatment, "it may be quite
persuasive."20 3 The majority explained that a judge or jury may reasonably conclude from the falsity of the explanation that the employer
is lying to cover up its true discriminatory purpose.20 4 In addition, discrimination may become the likely explanation because one always assumes some reason for an employer's action and the most plausible
source for a reason-the employer itself-has been removed.20 5
The Court was careful to preserve the holding in Hicks that a showing of pretext may not always be adequate to sustain a finding of liability.20 6 But the majority's examples of how a court or jury might find
against liability are not terribly persuasive. A record that features a
"conclusive[] ...nondiscriminatory reason" not presented by the employer, or "abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence" that
discrimination had not occurred, is certainly conceivable, but it is unlikely to arise often in practice.20 7 Justice Ginsburg, in a short concur198. Id. at 2104.
199. 120 S. Ct. at 2104.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2108.
202. Hicks featured vehement clashes between Justice Scalia (for himself and
Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas) and Justice Souter (for himself
and Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens). Since 1993, Justices White and Blackmun
have been replaced by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, changes that presumably would not
have altered the vote in Hicks. The Hicks dissent's insistence that the majority had "destroyed" the McDonnell Douglas framework (509 U.S. at 540) now seems hyperbolic, but
it may have had some chastening effect on one or more members of that majority.
203. 120 S. Ct. at 2108.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 2108-09.
206. See id. at 2109.
207. Id. A conclusive nondiscriminatory reason for the employer's decision would
surely have been presented at trial by competent counsel. A nondiscriminatory reason
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rence, seemed to capture the Court's true meaning on this score. She
anticipated that it "will be uncommon" for plaintiffs to have to submit
any evidence beyond establishing a prima facie case and pretext in
order to reach a jury or sustain a finding of liability.2 °8
Having disposed of the pretext-plus standard, the Reeves Court
addressed a subsidiary matter regarding what evidence a court may
consider when ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 20 9 The Court
held that review should encompass all evidence in the record, but added
that the reviewing court is required to "draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the nonmoving party" and must also "disregard all evidence
2 10
favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe."
The Fifth Circuit had failed to meet this test in several respects. Notably, the court did not draw all reasonable inferences in Mr. Reeves's
favor when it discounted the age-biased comments of the employer's
key manager and then
discredited the role that manager played in the
211
discharge decision.
Whether or not the Supreme Court's detailed critique of one circuit's overreaching was meant as a signal to other lower courts, the
employee-sensitive tone of the Court's discussion may well enhance
plaintiffs' prospects for sustaining favorable jury verdicts. The Reeves
opinion also reaffirmed that a lower court's approach to the evidence
when considering a motion for summary judgment must be identical to
the standard for review of the record under Rule 50 .212 This direct linkage should make it easier for employees to defeat summary judgment
motions and present their cases to a jury. Given that the Reeves decision
further refines the Court's McDonnell Douglas framework, its lowering
of evidentiary burdens applies to employees alleging discriminatory
treatment under Title VII and the ADA as well as the ADEA.
justifying the employer's decision after the fact would not bar liability though it could
affect the scope of relief. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352
(1995). The possibility of an employer having lied about its real reason for discharging
an older employee and also having in the record "abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence" of not discriminating in that very discharge decision is just thata possibility.
208. Id. at 2112. Justice Ginsburg elaborated that because "conclusive demonstrations" that discrimination could not have been the employer's true motive will be "atypical" once pretext has been shown, "the ultimate question of liability ordinarily should
not be taken from the jury." Id.
209. Rule 50 provides that before submission of the case to the jury, a court should
grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law when "a party has been fully heard on
an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find
for that party on that issue." FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). The circuits had diverged as to what
evidence could be considered when applying this Rule in the employment discrimination
context, though the Supreme Court concluded that the divergence was more apparent
than real. 120 S. Ct. at 2110.
210. 120 S. Ct. at 2110.
211. See id. at 2111.
212. See id. 2110 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S,, 242, 250-51
(1986)).
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V. ERISA and the Fiduciary Status of Health
Maintenance Organizations
2 13
In Pegram v. Herdrich,
a unanimous Court held that a health
maintenance organization (HMO) and its physicians do not act as fiduciaries under ERISA when they decide how to diagnose and treat a
patient's condition. HMOs have financial incentives to keep costs down
when making such mixed treatment and eligibility decisions,2 14 and a
contrary result could have dealt a fatal blow to the current managed
health care system. While the Court's holding is obviously a victory for
HMOs against plan beneficiaries seeking relief under a certain theory
in federal court, litigation against health care plans is likely to continue
on other theories and in alternative venues. The Court's analysis and
discussion are therefore important both for the issue actually decided
and for the questions that were left open until another day.
A. What the Pegram Court Decided
Pegram has an extended procedural history. The case was originally brought in 1992 in state court, by a woman who was covered
under her husband's employee benefit plan. 215 Herdrich's appendix had
ruptured after she was forced to wait eight days and travel 50 miles
for a diagnostic procedure that was available immediately, though at
higher cost, at her local hospital. 216 Herdrich sued her physician, Pegram, and her HMO for medical malpractice and eventually recovered
$35,000 following a jury trial on the state law claims. 217 During the
litigation, Herdrich added two counts of state law fraud against the
HMO. The defendants argued that ERISA preempted the new claims
and removed the case to federal court.21" Herdrich then amended her
complaint to allege that her physician-owned and administered HMO
rewarded its physician owners for limiting medical care, and that such
an arrangement-creating an incentive to make medical decisions in
physicians' self-interest rather than the exclusive interest of plan participants-constituted a breach of the ERISA fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty.21 9 This fiduciary claim was dismissed by the district
court, reinstated by the Seventh Circuit, and then dismissed again by
the Supreme Court for failure to state a claim under ERISA.2 2 °

213. 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000).
214. See id. at 2150, 2154-55.
215. Id. at 2147. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 1998).
216. 120 S. Ct. at 2147.
217. Id. at 2147-48. See 154 F.3d at 365.
218. 120 S. Ct. at 2147.
219. See id. at 2147-48. ERISA provides that persons acting as fiduciaries with
respect to a benefit plan must discharge Plan duties solely in the interest of participants
and beneficiaries, and are liable for breach of fiduciary duty if they fail to do so. See 29
U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1109, 1132 (1999).
220. See id. at 2148, 2158-59.
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The Court began its discussion by boldly recognizing a reality that
HMOs seldom if ever proclaim: rationing of health care is the defining
feature of an HMO system.2 21 Cost-control measures such as limitations on covered forms of treatment or medical conditions, and requirements for advance approval by an outside decisionmaker respecting
222
certain types of care, reflect the bottom-line objectives of all HMOs.
In the Court's view, the fact that some plans-like the one here-supplement those measures with year-end financial rewards to physicians
for minimizing treatment costs did not make them different in kind
from HMOs in general. Justice Souter, writing for the Court, delicately
acknowledged that an organizational scheme of annual payments to
physician owners "is not subtle" and he added that it may not be socially
desirable. 223 The Seventh Circuit, though, had determined that a fiduciary breach occurred based on the explicit incentive structure built
into this doctor-owned and administered HMO. 224 The Supreme Court
rejected as legally unsupportable any such distinction between good
determined to treat all HMOs
and bad HMO incentive schemes, and 225
alike for purposes of its ERISA review.
The Court's analysis then led it to conclude on two grounds that
medical treatment decisions were not fiduciary actions of the type covered under ERISA. First, the Court explored the context in which Congress had created fiduciary status. In defining the scope of fiduciary
obligations, Congress had relied on the common law of trusts. The legislative focus was on duties that traditionally were linked to "decisions
about managing assets and distributing property to beneficiaries."226
The ERISA legislative history confirmed that when considering the issue of fiduciary responsibility, Congress was principally concerned with
financial decisions regarding pension plans, more specifically with the
potential for mismanagement of plan assets and for incompetent plan
administration.22 7 Given Congress's initial concerns about fiduciary authority, the Court "doubt[ed]" that the law was meant to cover "the sorts
millions of times
of decisions made by licensed medical practitioners
228
setting."
medical
possible
every
in
day,
every

221. See id. at 2149. Unlike the fee-for-service system, in which doctors have financial incentives to provide more care rather than less, the Court opined that "a physician's
financial interest [in an HMO system] lies in providing less care, not more."Id. The check
on financial incentives under either system, according to the Court, is the physician's
professional and ethical obligation 'to exercise reasonable medical skill and judgment in
the patient's interest." Id.
222. See id.
223. Id. at 2150.
224. 154 F.3d at 370, 372-73.
225. 120 S. Ct. at 2150-51.
226. See id. at 2155 (describing fiduciary duties at common law).
227. See id. at 2156 (discussing ERISA legislative history).
228. Id. at 2155-56.
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The Court's doubt about congressional intent "harden[ed] into conviction" when it reviewed the consequences of permitting suits by patients challenging particular health care decisions in an HMO setting. 229 Allowing patients to sue under ERISA based on a decision to
delay or withhold certain medical services would inevitably require federal courts to determine whether such decisions were based solely on
reasonable medical judgment or were in part related to financial selfinterest. The Court was loathe to approve what it regarded as a "fed230
eraliz[ation of] malpractice litigation in the name of fiduciary duty."
Looking beyond ERISA, the Court also noted that Congress for nearly
three decades had enacted statutes encouraging the formation of HMO
practices.2 31 It would thoroughly undermine this policy were the Court
to entertain fiduciary claims that would become a virtual battering ram
against the HMO business form approved by Congress.23 2
B. What Pegram Did Not Decide
Although the Court unequivocally rejected the possibility that
HMOs can be held liable as ERISA fiduciaries for mixed treatment and
eligibility decisions, a number of important questions remain unanswered. One involves the status and scope of state law claims that patients may bring against HMOs. In New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company, the Court
had narrowly construed ERISA's express preemption language in upholding the validity of state law surcharges imposed on certain
HMOs. 233 Justice Souter, who also authored the Court's unanimous
opinion in Travelers,characterized that earlier decision as establishing
a strong presumption favoring state regulation of the health care
field.234 Based on the Court's determination in Pegram that mixed
treatment and eligibility decisions fall outside the scope of ERISA, it
seems likely that state malpractice claims are beyond the reach of
ERISA preemption. When HMOs arrange and provide treatment, either directly or through contracts with physicians and hospitals, Pegram strongly suggests that they may be sued under state law for negligence or comparable misconduct that pertains to their role as provider
or arranger of medical services. Many HMOs operate in multiple states,
and even those that do not may well be perceived by jurors as deeper
pockets than their physician co-defendants in malpractice actions. The
Court's decision may therefore herald an increase in state malpractice
litigation against HMOs in state courts. The Court tacitly encouraged
such a prospect when-acting one week after Pegram-it left undis229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 2156.
Id. at 2158.
See id. at 2156-57.
See id. at 2157.
514 U.S. 645 (1995).
120 S. Ct. at 2158.
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turbed a Third Circuit decision rejecting HMO assertions that various
state malpractice claims were preempted.23 5
A second area that bears watching involves the possibility that
HMOs may act as fiduciaries outside of the treatment setting. The Pegram Court emphasized that unlike a trustee at common law, an ERISA
fiduciary may wear several different hats at once, and the Court refrained from saying that HMOs could never owe a duty of undivided
loyalty under the act.2 36 The ERISA count in this case did not address
pure eligibility determinations or other administrative decisions separable from the exercise of medical judgment.23 7 Plan enrollees may
well be able to state a federal claim for relief with respect to the HMO's
determination not to cover a certain medical procedure at all, or allegations that it did an inadequate job of monitoring available funds and
keeping records. These types of decisions are more like the judgments
made at common law by trustees managing or administering plan assets. Assuming that HMOs may be sued for fiduciary breach under
ERISA with respect to such non-treatment-related decisions, the Court
will at some point have to decide whether state law claims based on
this type of HMO activity are preempted.
Even within the treatment context, the Court in a lengthy footnote
left the door open to HMOs being sued for not disclosing the existence
of the physician incentives to limit care that were an explicit feature of
this health plan's structure. 23 The Court previously had made clear
that ERISA plan administrators may be required to disclose information
about plan prospects that they have no fiduciary duty to change.2 39 The
complaint in Pegram did not allege failure to disclose, but the Court
seemed to anticipate if not invite future litigation under this theory.
Yet the Court's reasoning also invoked the special status of HMOs,
relying heavily on Congress's persistent 27 year effort to promote the
formation of such organizations. Health plans will presumably use the
Court's broad language to argue that any federal duty that might compromise the financial well-being of HMOs should be imposed by Congress, not the judiciary.
That argument leads into what is probably the largest unanswered
question after Pegram. The Court's refusal to hold HMOs accountable
under ERISA for their sometimes harsh rationing of health care leaves
it to Congress to create such accountability through a new statute. Con235. In re U.S. Healthcare Inc., 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom.,
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Bauman, 120 S. Ct. 2687 (2000).
236. See Pegram,120 S. Ct. at 2152 (discussing importance of focusing on whether
a person was acting as a fiduciary when engaging in conduct identified in the complaint
and not whether a person has status of fiduciary actor in general). The Court has made
this point in prior cases. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996).
237. See Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2155.
238. See id. at 2153-54 n.8.
239. See Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 505, cited with approval at 120 S. Ct. 2154 n.8.
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gress has been struggling to define patients' rights and remedies in a
managed care system for a number of years. 240 By making clear that
patients have no such rights under the most relevant federal statute,
and that Congress rather than the judiciary retains the power "to restrict... approval of HMO practice to certain preferred forms,"241 the
Court has turned up the heat. It is possible that a deal will be struck
in the next several months, especially if the managed care lobby decides
that the risks of becoming bogged down in 50 different state court systems are simply too great. Still, it would be remarkable if Congress can
rise to the challenge of crafting broadly acceptable patients' rights leg242
islation in a presidential election year.
VI. Wrongful Discharge and RICO Conspiracies
The final workplace decision, Beck v. Prupis,243 concerns whether
a wrongfully discharged whistleblower may assert a civil conspiracy
claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
of 1970 (RICO). The Court in recent years has regularly tackled issues
presented by RICO's complex civil and criminal provisions.2 44 The Beck
case illustrates the growing extent to which controversies involving
such statutes of general application have piqued
the Court's interest in
245
the context of employer-employee relations.
The facts before the Court are based on petitioner's evidence.2 46
While serving as president and CEO of an insurance holding company,
240. See Robert Pear, Ruling Sends Call for Action to Congress and the States, N.Y.
June 13, 2000, at A-23 (reviewing five years of unsuccessful legislative efforts and
discussing current status of House-Senate differences).
241. 120 S. Ct. at 2157.
242. The other ERISA case decided this term, HarrisTrust and Say. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2180 (2000), involved a dispute between a pension
plan and a securities broker dealer that executed equity trades at the direction of plan
fiduciaries, trades that later proved worthless. See id. at 2185. Section 406 of ERISA
prohibits a plan fiduciary from causing the plan to engage in certain transactions with a
"party in interest," but that section imposes no specific duties on the nonfiduciary party
in interest. A unanimous Court concluded that even absent such express duties, the
nonfiduciary party may be held liable under the language of section 502(a)(3), one of
ERISA's remedial provisions. See id. at 2186-91. Not every case receives its just recognition in a survey presentation of this kind. The Court's decision in HarrisTrust enhances
the power of plan participants and beneficiaries, as well as trustees, to recover from
nonfiduciary actors that knowingly participated in the fiduciary's violation of the Act.
243. 120 S. Ct. 1608 (2000).
244. See, e.g., Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994); Holmes
v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992); H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
492 U.S. 229 (1989); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985); United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
245. See supra at n.17 and accompanying text (discussing how Court's labor and
employment law decisions increasingly involve miscellaneous statutes primarily addressed to non-workplace regulation but giving rise to controversy in particular workplace settings).
246. See 120 S. Ct. at 1612 n.3 (noting that when reviewing the appellate court's
affirmance of summary judgment against Beck, the Court accepts as true the evidence
that he presented at the district court level).
TIMES,
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petitioner discovered that several directors and officers had engaged in
illegal activities, including diverting corporate funds for personal use
and submitting false financial statements to regulators and shareholders.247 He informed law enforcement officials about the illegal conduct,
and was subsequently discharged in retaliation for his whistleblowing.24 s In federal court, petitioner alleged various forms of racketeering
activities and also a conspiracy to engage in such activities.2 4 9 Critically
for this case, petitioner alleged that his wrongful termination was itself
in furtherance of the conspiracy and therefore gave rise to a cause of
action for violation of RICO's civil conspiracy provision, 18 U.S.C.
§1962(d).25 °
The circuit courts had split on the issue of whether a terminated
whistleblower had standing to bring a claim under RICO's conspiracy
provisions even though the overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy
(i.e., the termination) was not a prohibited racketeering activity under
18 U.S.C. §1962(a), (b), or (c). 25 The Supreme Court held against the
whistleblowers, ruling that RICO provides a cause of action for conspiracy only to individuals injured by reason of an act that is independently unlawful under the statute. 25 2 Wrongful termination is not an
act of racketeering as defined in RICO and thus does not qualify.
The Court relied primarily on the common law of civil conspiracy
to reach this result. Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, took the
position that when Congress enacted RICO in 1970, it was well established at common law that a plaintiff's civil conspiracy claim depended
upon the existence of an underlying tortious act.25 3 Drawing on the
"benign fiction" 254 that an enacting Congress is aware of and means to
247. Id. at 1612.
248. Id.
249. Id. § 1962 sets forth the conduct prohibited under RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1962
(1994). "Racketeering activity" is defined by cross-reference to a long list of criminal
prohibitions in Title 18, including mail fraud, wire fraud, and extortion. Subsections (a),
(b), and (c) of § 1962 make it unlawful to use or invest income derived from racketeering
activity, to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise by means of racketeering
activity, or otherwise to participate in an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of such
racketeering activity. Id.
250. 120 S.Ct. at 1612-13.
251. See id. at 1613 (summarizing split between majority of circuits denying standing-First, Second, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh-and minority of circuits allowing RICO
conspiracy claims where only overt action was employment termination-Third, Fifth,
Seventh).
252. 120 S. Ct. at 1616.
253. Id. at 1613-15. The dissenters, Justices Stevens and Souter, disputed at
some length the majority's characterization of the common law precedent and argued
that RICO's plain language supported petitioner's right of action for conspiracy. Id. at
1617-20.
254. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (emphasis added) (stating that statutory interpretation involves looking for
"which meaning is... most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the
provision must be integrated-a compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume
Congress always has in mind"). See also Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 504
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incorporate the surrounding body of law, the Court concluded that civil
conspiracy claims under RICO were likewise derivative of the
under255
lying substantive law prohibitions contained in the statute.
RICO's textual provisions and legislative history suggest that Congress meant to sweep broadly when it entered the new domain of combating organized criminal activity,25 6 and the Court has often relied on
that text and history to construe the act in rather broad terms. 257 The
Beck case, however, presented the Court with the prospect of extending
RICO into an area of civil law that has traditionally been governed by
state legislative and judicial initiatives. The Court was not willing to
take such a step toward federalization of wrongful discharge law. While
the decision constitutes a victory for employer interests, a narrowing
construction of RICO's conspiracy provisions may also be relevant for
unions, which at times have been the target of RICO actions in connection with routine organizing campaigns or strikes. 25' Federal courts
have often expressed reluctance to let RICO draw them into ordinary
labor disputes 259; the Beck decision doubtless reflects such judicial caution regarding RICO's impact on workplace controversies.
VII. Conclusion
Although somewhat light in volume, the labor and employment law
product this term included several decisions of considerable importance. The Court's choice of which cases to decide punctuated two general trends: attention to workplace law statutes enacted after the
NLRA and Title VII (Kimel, Christensen,Reeves, Pegram,HarrisTrust),
and an increased focus on laws of general application that give rise to
U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (stating that Congress should be understood to legislate with the
expectation that the common law principle of preclusion will apply).
255. See 120 S. Ct. at 1615-17.
256. See, e.g., Thrkette, 452 U.S. at 586-87.
257. See H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242, 245-48 (relying on legislative history to support
a broad construction of RICO provisions); Sedima, 473 U.S. at 486-93 (same); Russello
v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23-29 (1983) (same); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 586-87, 59193 (same). Cf.Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269 n. 15 (distinguishing argument based on legislative
history in giving text a narrow construction). Notably, neither the majority nor the dissent
in Beck referred to RICO's extensive legislative history to support their positions.
258. See, e.g., Monterey Plaza Hotel Ltd. P'ship v. Local 483, Hotel and Rest. Employees Union, 215 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2000) (addressing RICO claims against union in
organizing drive setting); Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs, & Helpers Local
Union 639, 913 F.2d 948, 952-56 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc) (addressing RICO claims
against union in recognition strike setting). See also, Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l,
901 F.2d 404, 425-30 (5th Cir. 1990) (addressing RICO claims against union in contract
negotiation setting).
259. See, e.g., Hubbard v. United Airlines, Inc., 927 F.2d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 926-30 (3d Cir. 1982); United Food and Commercial
Workers, Local 400 v. Marval Poultry Co., 708 F. Supp. 761,767 (W.D. Va. 1989); Butchers'
Union, Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1001, 1009-11 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
Compare United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973) (holding that Hobbs Act is not
applicable to ordinary labor disputes involving strike-related violence).
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workplace rights disputes (Locke, Beck). A recurring substantive theme
was the preservation of state law jurisdiction and state sovereignty and
an unwillingness to construe broadly the scope of federal law or congressional authority (Kimel, Christensen,Pegram,Beck; but see Locke).
Consistent with this theme, public employers continue to fare especially well before the Court (Kimel, Christensen).Finally, the Rehnquist
Era is now entering its fifteenth Term (the Burger Court had 17), with
several Justices rumored to be considering retirement following the
presidential election. In the Eleventh Amendment area, and others as
well, the Court's future course seems at best uncertain. Charting that
course, however, would begin a whole new story, one that requires
someone other than a mere mechanic, or even an architect, as narrator.
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